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In Search of an Established Church
Teresa M. Bejan*
INTRODUCTION

I approach the question guiding this Symposium as a political
theorist, as well as a historian of political thought. I approach it,
too, as an American—albeit one who has lived and taught for many
years overseas. The politics of religion in the United States
fascinates me, personally and professionally. I am interested above
all to understand the way in which past ways of thinking and doing
have affected—and continue to affect—how we think about politics,
and how we do things politically, today.
For many political theorists, the question “Is America a
Christian Nation?” will provoke a straightforward¾“no.”
Empirically, while a strong majority (65% in 2019) of Americans
still identify as Christian when asked, that number has declined
sharply over the past decade.1 At the same time the rise of the
“Nones,” i.e., those Americans who claim no religious affiliation,
identified by Robert Putnam and David Campbell in 2010 proceeds
apace.2 More important than the facts—for political theorists
anyway—is the theory. And in theory, the United States of America
is a liberal democracy, one of many in Europe and the global
Anglosphere, defined by its commitment to the separation of church
and state, individual rights, and religious pluralism.
* Associate Professor of Political Theory, University of Oxford,
teresa.bejan@politics.ox.ac.uk.
1. In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-sdecline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/ [https://perma.cc/W2ZW-QK
B6].
2. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN
GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US (2010).
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The United States is thus, aspirationally at least, a secular
state. While the vast majority of Americans in this era and others
have been Christians, on the national level the state is committed
to disestablishment—that is, to the absence of public subsidies to
religion or formal relations between the government and any
particular church—as well as to observing an impartial “neutrality”
between the religions of its citizens as far as any accommodations
or exemptions from generally applicable laws are concerned.
Indeed, the leading liberal political philosopher of the twentieth
century, John Rawls, had America in mind as a model when he
described the challenges facing a nearly “well-ordered” liberal
society characterized by pluralism in its citizens’ “comprehensive
doctrines” and an imperfectly “overlapping consensus” among them
on the political (but not metaphysical) conception of justice
governing its public institutions.3
On this view, the formal separation of church and state—
institutionally, symbolically, and above all financially—appears as
essential in securing the secularism of liberal democracies. And
yet, even political theorists admit that this principle has manifested
very differently in different places. French secularism, or laïcité, is
notoriously aggressive, extending even to an intolerance of the
display of religious symbols by private citizens in public places.4
Secular liberal democracy looks different in Germany and the
Netherlands as well, countries in which state-funding and support
for religion are seen as consistent with secularism, so long as that
support is not limited to any single denomination.5 And, of course,
established churches remain alive and well not only among the
social democracies of Scandinavia,6 but in the United Kingdom, too,

3. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
765 (1997) [hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason Revisited], reprinted in JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 440, 440, 462, 482 (expanded ed., 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. Rawls disfavored the term “neutrality” in
his work. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 190-91.
4. Cecile Laborde, Toleration and laicite, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION
IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 161, 161 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds.,
2018).
5. See Tariq Modood, Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism, in
CONTESTING SECULARISM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 69, 81-83 (Anders BergSorensen, ed., 2013).
6. Sweden and Norway have formally disestablished their national
churches, but the Protestant national church of Denmark remains. T. R. Reid,
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where the Churches of England and Scotland and their clergy
continue to enjoy state funding and privileges not extended to other
faiths.7
In her recent book, Liberalism’s Religion, the political theorist
Cecile Laborde accepts this diversity as consistent with liberal
egalitarian principles. Moreover, she denies that state neutrality
is a necessary—or even plausible—generalization of “the old idea of
religious nonestablishment” or church-state separation.8 In this,
she gives ground to liberalism’s critics, above all scholars of critical
religion like the late Saba Mahmood, Winnifred Sullivan, and
Stanley Fish.9 These critics argue, inter alia, that not only is the
liberal presumption of neutrality an insupportable pretense, one
masking an arbitrary exercise of power, but that the “liberalism” of
liberal democratic societies is itself a form of hegemonic (if
submerged) Protestant Christianity, one that demands that all
other religions recreate themselves in its own image.10
On this view, liberal democracies like the United States have
an established religion—namely, Protestantism—even though they
do not have an established church. While she rejects this
conclusion, Laborde agrees with the critics thus far—that many
liberal political theorists lack imagination when it comes to the

Church of Sweden Is Thriving on Its Own, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/29/church-of-sweden-is-thriving-on-its-own/2a52605f-40c4-43f6-b1cd-9c16f7b27a4e/
[https://perma.cc/SS23-T2ZB] (Sweden); Elin Hofverberg, Norway: State and
Church Separate After 500 Years, LIBRARY OF CONG. (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/norway-state-and-church-separate-after-500-years/ [perma.cc/L7MH-U7PB] (Norway); Religion and Identity,
DENMARK, https://denmark.dk/people-and-culture/religion [https://perma.cc/
W9CP-N2NK] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
7. See generally THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND, https://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/home [perma.cc/2V9Q-MSJA]; THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,
https://www.churchofengland.org/ [perma.cc/65PM-8HK4].
8. CECILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 19, 69 (2017).
9. See generally SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR
AGE: A MINORITY REPORT (2016); WINNIFRED SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (new ed. 2018); Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling
the Just Bounds between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997).
For other works on the topic, see generally TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE
SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003); ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD,
BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF RELIGION (2015).
10. For a survey of these criticisms, see LABORDE, supra note 8, at 19–25.
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variety of practices consistent with their principles.11 She describes
two societies, “Secularia” and “Divinitia”: the former strictly secular
in all respects, while the latter formally recognizes one particular
religion, both in its public symbols and its laws, while protecting
and providing exemptions for others.12 Laborde concludes that
“both are legitimate liberal states . . . [and] in practice, liberal
democratic states exhibit features of both.”13 Her analysis
suggests, moreover, that liberal objections to the latter are more
often a reflection of prejudice than principle. When it comes to the
question before us, then, Laborde might respond that the United
States could be a Christian nation, if it wanted to be, without losing
its liberal democratic character.
Laborde’s analysis is powerful and, I think, persuasive.14 Still,
it will leave many Americans uneasy. Any student coming from the
United States to study at Oxford, for example, will not be alienated
by the sacred architecture, which has been copied by many selfstyled temples of learning in her own land. But the presence of
Anglican chapels and chaplains at the center of collegiate life in a
publicly-funded university cannot help but be offensive to American
mores. It violates directly the principle of disestablishment—what
Thomas Jefferson described “as a wall of separation between
Church & State”—that Americans take to be the sine qua non of
secular liberalism.15
Here, Americans can appeal and do, as is our wont, to the First
Amendment. In its very first clause (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion”16), one finds the rock on
which our nation failed to build its Church. While the meaning of
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 19–25.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 152.
See Teresa Bejan, Liberalism’s Parish: On Liberalism’s Religion,
SYNDICATE THEOLOGY (2019), https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology
/liberalisms-religion/ [perma.cc/AX7W-94N7].
15. Thomas Jefferson, Draft Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-020152-0002 [https://perma.cc/E6NA-LKW8] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021). When
state support is offered, as in the case of some parochial schools in the United
States, that support is available to all, not enjoyed as a privilege by any particular church and its personnel. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue,
140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
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the Establishment Clause has been much debated,17 James
Madison’s draft language on which the final text was based seems
clear enough: “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established . . . .”18 As the constitutional historian Jack Rakove
points out, Madison and Jefferson were of one mind in seeing the
public maintenance of any particular religion or its personnel as a
violation of the equal right of all citizens to the liberty of conscience,
by compelling them to support, financially or otherwise, a faith
contrary to their own.19
On this view, the quintessentially American answer to the
question, “Is America a Christian nation?,” must be, doubly¾“no.”
From its inception, the United States has had no established
religion, nor any established or national Church.20 There is a wellknown historical narrative shared by political theorists, as well as
constitutional lawyers and legal historians, that traces this
disestablishmentarian view of liberty of conscience through
Jefferson to the first English saint of secular liberalism, John Locke
(1632–1704).21 Still, others prefer a narrative starting closer to
home, noting that Roger Williams (c.1603–1683) of Rhode Island

17. Compare, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 417 (2002) (positing that “an accurate
account of the intellectual origins of the Establishment Clause does not, and
cannot, provide a definitive answer to the question of what exactly the Establishment Clause prohibited then or prohibits now”), and NOAH FELDMAN,
DIVIDED BY GOD 19–56 (2005) (criticizing both traditional and revisionist histories of the First Amendment), with Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of its Incorporation, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 639 (2006) (arguing that a true commitment to “the original meaning of the Establishment Clause requires the disincorporation of the
provision” to the states).
18. Donald L. Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James Madison and
the First Amendment, 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 427, 430 (1983).
19. See JACK RAKOVE, BEYOND BELIEF, BEYOND CONSCIENCE: THE RADICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 66–100 (2020).
20. There were, of course, established churches in some of the original thirteen states, including Massachusetts, Muñoz, supra note 17, at 601, 605–06, a
point I return to below.
21. E.g., FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 29–31; PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 53–55 (2002); cf. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330
U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947) (viewing Jefferson’s participation in the passage of Virginia’s Bill for Religious Freedom as instructive of the meaning of the First
Amendment’s religion clauses).
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used the phrase “wall of separation” more than a century and a half
before Jefferson.22 The political theorist and law professor Martha
Nussbaum has elevated Williams as America’s “First Founder” on
this basis, as well as presenting him as the first in a long line of
thinkers in a secular liberal tradition culminating in Rawls
himself.23
In my first book, Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of
Toleration, I argued that the self-understanding of American
liberals like Nussbaum as descendants of Locke and Williams
reflects a widespread misunderstanding of those thinkers’ actual
views on religious toleration, as well as the historical process by
which our peculiar “First Amendment faith” developed.24 In this
essay, I shall focus more narrowly on the issue of (dis)establishment
and consider how each of the three thinkers—Williams, Locke, and
Rawls—identified as pillars of American secular liberalism by
scholars understood it as a necessary implication (or not) of their
prior commitments to the separation of church and state.
I begin by offering an overview of the significance of early
modern toleration debates for the development of political
liberalism, before providing a brief survey of the seventeenthcentury historical context within which Anglophone debates about
disestablishment took place. This was, crucially, an
establishmentarian context, wherein toleration was figured as a
problem caused by “dissenting” individuals and congregations, who
could or could not be “indulged” or “comprehended” by the episcopal

22. For more on the relationship between Williams and Jefferson and the
“wall of separation,” see generally JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL (2012); DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002);
TIMOTHY HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998); ALAN E. JOHNSON, THE FIRST AMERICAN FOUNDER:
ROGER WILLIAMS AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (2015); Benjamin J. Hertzberg,
Religion’s Influence on the Wall of Separation: Insights from Roger Williams,
James Burgh, and Thomas Jefferson, 23 SIGMA J. POL. & INT’L STUD. 1 (2005).
23. Martha Nussbaum, The First Founder: the American Revolution of
Roger Williams, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 10, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/61558/the-first-founder [perma.cc/UA62-M7AS]; see generally MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008).
24. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 29–30 (2012) (describing
Americans’ “First Amendment faith”). See generally TERESA M. BEJAN, MERE
CIVILITY: DISAGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION (2017).
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Church of England.25 As we shall see, neither Williams nor Locke
viewed the problem with establishment as solely—or even
primarily—a matter of individual liberty of conscience, nor did they
understand established churches simply as the beneficiaries of
state-maintenance or financial support, but as properly
representative and “public” institutions at the heart of the res
publica.26 The point for both was rather that “National” churches
like the Church of England encouraged a conflation of civil and
spiritual communities and their respective standards of
membership.
This understanding produced counter-intuitive
consequences for both Locke and Williams when it came to the
formal, institutional, financial, or symbolic disestablishment of
public churches, and whether it was or was not a requirement of
their separationist principles.
In what follows, I argue that Williams advocated for
disestablishment in a way recognizable to modern liberals, whereas
Locke did not. Still, both saw a continuing place for what we today
might think of as “established religion” in a tolerant society, even
in the absence of a state-supported ecclesiastical establishment.
For Williams, a tolerant society depended on what I call the
inadvertent establishment of a form of evangelical and sectarian
Protestantism in its legal regime; for Locke, it required rather the
informal establishment of an irenic and liberal Protestantism in its
public (albeit non-governmental) institutions, such as universities.
In light of this historical analysis, I then turn to modern
liberalism and its understanding of religious toleration as
expounded by John Rawls (1921–2002). I argue that Rawls himself
was steeped in early modern debates to an underappreciated
extent, and that this informed a parallel, neglected turn from an
“evangelical” to an avowedly “irenic” form of liberalism in his
thought. I conclude by suggesting that the latter, especially, is
crucial for understanding American secular liberalism today, which
functions (aspirationally, at least) not as an established religion, as
its critics claim, but rather as an established church.

25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Parts IV and V; cf. Arash Abizadeh, Publicity, Privacy, and
Religious Toleration in Hobbes’s Leviathan, 10 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 261, 284–91
(2013) (suggesting that contemporary thinkers recognized a difference between
public acts by individuals and public institutions with respect to religious toleration).
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I. HAUNTED BY HISTORY

American jurists and legal historians look largely to the
Founding generation to understand the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. They remain generally disinclined to set
these eighteenth-century debates in their broader historical
context. This includes not only the various pre-revolutionary
church-state arrangements of the British colonies of North
America, but also the long-running religious conflicts that
dominated post-Reformation Europe, which produced so many of
the religious refugees—as well as arguments, concepts, and
categories—that subsequently travelled to the New World.27
Indeed, despite the eagerness of constitutional scholars to link
American disestablishment with the theories of seventeenthcentury thinkers like Williams and Locke, they have shown a
remarkable disinterest in the English and European debates about
toleration and religious establishment in which these figures were
engaged.28
This scholarly neglect is in stark contrast with the almost
obsessive attachment to early modernity as the origin of modern
27. For a welcome corrective, see generally RAKOVE, supra note 19. For
other excellent revisionist works by historians, see generally CHRIS BENEKE,
BEYOND TOLERATION: THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PLURALISM (2006);
JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND, 1558–
1689 (2000); EVAN HAEFELI, NEW NETHERLAND AND THE DUTCH ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2012); BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH:
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE PRACTICE OF TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE (2007); ANDREW R. MURPHY, CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY: REVISITING
TOLERATION AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(2001); ANDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND TOLERATION: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN (2016); SCOTT SOWERBY, MAKING
TOLERATION: THE REPEALERS AND THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION (2013);
ALEXANDRA WALSHAM, CHARITABLE HATRED: TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE IN
ENGLAND, 1500–1700 (2006). For another recent exception that adopts a transatlantic perspective, see generally THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Michael D. Breidenbach & Owen Anderson eds., 2020).
28. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The ChurchState Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385,
1420–21, 1524–25 (2004) (discussing Locke and Williams’ influence on early
church-state debate without mention of wider contexts in which their arguments were made). For instance, Williams published all of his works in London
during his lifetime, save the anti-Quaker polemic, George Fox Digg’d out of his
Burrovves (1676), published for a receptive audience in Boston. See HENRY
CHUPACK, ROGER WILLIAMS 62 (1969).
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liberalism among political theorists. The most striking version of
the claim comes, fittingly enough, in Rawls’s Political Liberalism:
“the historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more
generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long
controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.”29 The story of liberalism as Rawls tells it
is thus the story of the rise of religious toleration in early modern
Europe and the gradual realization that political stability did not
require religious unity—a realization that allowed for the extension
of the principle of toleration to other forms of difference.30
This historical narrative is not exactly “Whig.” Rather, it is a
refined version of what would become the standard narrative about
toleration among revisionist historians, including Herbert
Butterfield, the man who coined the term “Whig History.”31
According to this narrative, the emergence of toleration in early
modern Europe was not the inevitable unfolding of a philosophical
principle of liberal Enlightenment.32 It was not a product of
principle at all, but rather the result of battle fatigue after a century
of religious warfare.33 It was, in Butterfield’s words, “a last resort
for those who often still hated one another, but found it impossible
to go on fighting.”34
This revisionist narrative has also been rehearsed by
liberalism’s critics, for whom it serves as further evidence that
liberal secularism is both a product and an instrument of
centralizing state power, Western imperialism, and Protestant
mission. For thinkers like Mahmood or Wendy Brown, Locke serves

29. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at xxiv.
30. See id. at xxvii–xxix (expanding that Rawls’s views on political liberalism not only improve religious toleration but also toleration of other forms of
difference, including race and gender).
31. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 6
(1965); see KEITH C. SEWELL, HERBERT BUTTERFIELD AND THE INTERPRETATION
OF HISTORY 30–31 (2005) (stating Whig history is the study of the past with
reference to the present which is altered with historical fallacies put in place
by those who are the “winners” in the historical context).
32. See Herbert Butterfield, Toleration in Early Modern Times, 38 J. HIST.
IDEAS 573, 575–76 (1977).
33. See id. at 573, 575–78, 580, 584.
34. Id. at 573. Butterfield further stated, “[i]t was hardly even an ‘idea’
for the most part—just a happening—the sort of thing that happens when no
choice is left and there is no hope of further struggle being worth while.” Id.
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as a sort of villain, and his notorious exclusion of Catholics and
atheists from toleration in his famous 1689 A Letter Concerning
Toleration—not to mention his own involvement in supporting
missionary efforts in the Americas—is a smoking gun.35 For them,
liberal toleration boils down to a demand that all religions recreate
themselves in the image of Protestant Christianity (as a beliefbased, individualistic, and voluntaristic creed), which then
suppresses or excludes all that do not.36
Of course, neither version of this story will satisfy historians.
In the last two decades, abundant scholarship has troubled
Butterfield’s account of the “rise” of toleration, as well as the
identity of liberalism and Locke’s place within it. As Duncan Bell
notes, Locke was only latterly elevated as liberalism’s founding
father, well into the nineteenth century.37 Moreover, the “rise” of
toleration after the Reformation (not to mention its “fall”
beforehand) was hardly straightforward. To take only one example,
the 1689 Act of Toleration, identified by Rawls as evidence of the
principle of liberty of conscience being “largely won” in England,38
was not an act of toleration at all, but one of “Indulgence” that
suspended without repealing the existing penal laws mandating
church attendance, and that only for Trinitarian Protestants.39
35. See MAHMOOD, supra note 9, at 33, 48–49, 78; WENDY BROWN,
REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 31–32
(2006); cf. Fish, supra note 9, at 2269–72 (noting that the omission of a general,
independent principle of toleration in Locke’s work reveals his reliance on a de
facto exercise of power over religious minorities).
36. For other versions of this argument, see John Gray, Pluralism and Toleration in Contemporary Political Philosophy, 48 POL. STUD. 323, 323–25
(2000); Jakob De Roover & S. N. Balagangadhara, John Locke, Christian Liberty, and the Predicament of Liberal Toleration, 36 POL. THEORY 523, 524–25,
527, 531–32 (2008). For recent restatements of the “Protestantization” critique
in arguments about the limits of Liberalism’s approach to religious insult, see
Talal Asad, Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism, in IS CRITIQUE
SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 14, 17, 34, 47 (2013). But see
Andrew F. March, Speech and the Sacred: Does the Defense of Free Speech Rest
on a Mistake about Religion?, 40 POL. THEORY 319, 320, 322–24, 337–38 (2012).
37. See Duncan Bell, What is Liberalism?, 42 POL. THEORY 682, 692–93
(2014); cf. HELENA ROSENBLATT, THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM
ANCIENT ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY passim (2018) (examining a
number of other important liberal thinkers).
38. See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
11 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2008).
39. See infra Part II pp. 298–300.
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Some of the most notorious examples of English intolerance, such
as the Anti-Catholic Gordon Riots of 1780, were yet to come.40
So, too, for the critical religion narrative. Secular liberal
principles of toleration and liberty of conscience may well have
originated in majority-Protestant contexts, but “Protestantism” is
itself a very various phenomenon.41 In Mere Civility, I argued that
the United States owes its peculiar constellation of individual
rights to free exercise and expression in the First Amendment to
the relative density and abundance in the colonies of sectarian
evangelicals like Roger Williams.42 But this kind of evangelical
Protestant was never in the majority in England, let alone the
countries of continental Europe. The variety of liberal democratic,
church-state arrangements noted in the introduction similarly
belies the idea that a single “Protestant” orientation can explain
their emergence.43 This is true especially with regard to the issue
of establishment and the persistence of public churches in Europe.
Furthermore, I agree with Laborde that the fact that some of the
arrangements preferred by modern liberals originated in particular
facets of Protestant theology or ecclesiology does not in itself
disqualify them as inconsistent with liberals’ normative principles
of liberty and equality.44 Indeed, they would seem rather to enjoy
a presumption of being at least more consistent than the
alternatives evidently imagined, if not articulated, by liberalism’s
critics.45
Still, the extent to which the language of liberal political theory
and jurisprudence reveals its early modern origins is remarkable.
Theorists prefer to use the emphatically early modern coinage of
“toleration” over “tolerance,” as well as terms like “establishment,”
40. See, e.g., The Gordon Riots, U.K. NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/rights/gordon.htm
[https://perma.cc/VE2U-PN62] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
41. See De Roover & Balagangadhara, supra note 36, at 524–25, 527, 531–
32. But see STUART B. SCHWARTZ, ALL CAN BE SAVED: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
AND SALVATION IN THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC WORLD 225–27, 248 (2008) (noting beliefs in toleration and liberty of conscience could be found all over in Spain, the
Caribbean, and South America even though the ideas started out as purely
Protestant).
42. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 167–68, 171–72.
43. See supra Introduction pp. at 285–87.
44. LABORDE, supra note 8, at 16–17.
45. See id.
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“conscience,” and “nonconformity.” Political philosophers will
debate how much “latitude” should be granted to “dissent”—and
disagree about whether claims of conscience should be extended to
matters that are, strictly speaking, “indifferent.”46
This early modern technical vocabulary reminds us that
modern English is itself a product of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. But it also betrays the extent to which the language
political theorists and philosophers use to describe the challenges
of coexistence under conditions of religious diversity is itself the
product of a particular ecclesiastical context—namely, that of an
established church. Even today, our analytic concepts reflect those
of the Church of England and its peculiar brand of Protestant
episcopalianism, as an institution that debated for centuries how
much “dissent” or disagreement it could accommodate within its
communion while remaining a unified, properly public Church.47
II. PAROCHIALISM AND ESTABLISHMENT

Elsewhere, I have noted the persistent conceptual
parochialism of political theory when it comes to the challenges of
coexistence under conditions of religious diversity.48 Indeed, the
term “parochial” is itself illustrative of the general process whereby
Anglo-Catholic ideas and institutions were reappropriated and
redeployed by the Tudor state after the Reformation. As a
descriptive term, the adjective “parochial” means simply “of or
belonging to the parish” as a unit of ecclesiastical, and later civil,
governance.49 Parishes developed in the Middle Ages as small
territorial units organized around a single church and its minister.
These units thus enjoyed a well-defined geographic and
administrative place within the Anglo-Catholic ecclesiastical
hierarchy. During the English Reformation, the Tudor monarchy
effectively nationalized the existing parish systems in order to
implement the Poor Law and other social policies.
Understanding the process whereby the newly “National,” as
opposed to Catholic or universal, church assumed not only the
46. Bejan, supra note 14.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; Parochial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www-oedcom.rwulaw.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/138040?redirectedFrom=parochial&
[https://perma.cc/G4J8-Q2QG] [(last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
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religious—but the administrative, educative, economic, and
philanthropic—roles and resources of its Anglo-Catholic
predecessor is crucial in making sense of how the issue of
establishment presented itself to English Protestants in the
seventeenth century—including the evangelicals like Roger
Williams, who emigrated to the New World. Most of these refugees
(including the more famous Pilgrims of Plymouth Rock) were also
Puritans.50 While many Americans will recognize “Puritan” today
as a pejorative—if not from early American history, then from H.L.
Mencken’s famous dictum51—few will understand the label’s
origins. This name (or, in early modern English, “denomination”)
was coined as a pejorative in the sixteenth century to describe
Protestants within the newly Protestant Church of England who
believed that the work of Reformation had not gone far enough.52
So-called “Puritans” could not help but notice the ease with
which the Anglican Church had accommodated itself to AngloCatholic institutions—not only parishes, but episcopacy (that is,
government by bishops), miters, surplices, kneeling, incense, and
all the rest—and concluded that the English hierarchy had made
premature peace with the Whore of Babylon (i.e., Roman
Catholicism), thereby stopping the godly work of Reformation in its
tracks.53 Initially, these “Puritans”—while meeting occasionally in
private prayer and scripture-reading groups called “conventicles”—
were committed to remaining members of the Church of England so
as to be able to reform it from within.54 But over time, and under
persecution, some Puritans formally separated from the National
Church to form their own “dissenting” congregations.55

50. MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, HOT PROTESTANTS:
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 71–82 (2018).

THE HISTORY

OF

PURITANISM

51. A Puritan, Mencken tells us, is someone dominated by the “fear that
someone, somewhere, may be happy.”
H. L. MENCKEN, A MENCKEN
CHRESTOMATHY 624 (H.L. Mencken ed., First Vintage Books ed., 1982).
52. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 93.
53. See id. at 93–94.
54. See KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 141.
55. See William Wallace Fenn, John Robinson’s Farewell Address, 13
HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 236, 239–40 (1920). One such congregation, led by
John Robinson, fled abroad and settled in Leyden before deciding to remove
wholesale to the New World. WINSHIP, supra note 50, at 62. Although their
intended destination was Virginia, these so-called “Pilgrims” had to make do
with Plymouth, Massachusetts when a violent storm blew their ship, the
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Still, the majority of Puritans remained in England,
determined to push the established Church towards the purity of
“primitive” Christianity, from within. A renewed campaign of
persecution—led by the unfortunate Charles I and his equally
unfortunate Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud—led to
another wave of religious refugees (including Williams) in the
1630s. After this, however, those who stayed behind got their
chance.56 When the English Civil War broke out in 1642, almost
the first item on the Long Parliament’s agenda was to abolish
bishops (finally accomplished in 164657) and “establish” a more
godly form of Church-government in its place.58 Here, however, the
Puritans were themselves divided between Presbyterians, who
wanted to impose Scottish discipline and unity on the English
Church, and “Independents” or Congregationalists, who wanted
individual churches to be able to organize themselves and choose
their own ministers under the umbrella (and watchful eye) of the
ecclesiastical establishment. Under the latter system, the National
Church would act as a centralized regulatory body overseeing the
training and ordination of clergy.59 Unable to agree, the breakdown
of negotiations between Presbyterians and Independents led to a de
facto (albeit limited) toleration under Oliver Cromwell during the
Interregnum.60
The episcopal Church of England—which still exists to this
day—would be fully reestablished along with the monarchy in
1660,61 after which it quickly got down to the business of cracking
down on dissent. It pursued this persecutory program with the
support of Parliament until the so-called “Toleration Act” of 1689
Mayflower, off course. See id. at 71–72. For a first-hand account, see generally
WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620–1647 (Henry Wish ed.,
Capricorn Books 1962) (1912).
56. See RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 27.
57. Marcus Harmes, The Universality of Discipline: Restoration of the English Episcopacy, 1660–1688, 33 RENAISSANCE & REFORM 55, 59 (2010).
58. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 135–36.
59. See RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 27.
60. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 147–48; cf. Blair Worden, Toleration and
the Cromwellian Protectorate, in PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION 199, 227 (W. J.
Sheils ed., 1984) (during the close of the Interregnum, toleration was provided
to some sects of “peaceable dissenters,” yet still it was still forbidden to blaspheme, particularly by espousing any anti-trinitarian doctrines).
61. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 28.
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broke its monopoly on public worship for good.62 As Rakove notes,
persecution by the re-established Church came in predominately
two forms: penal laws and Test Acts.63 The former imposed steep
fines, and even imprisonment, for non-attendance at public
worship, while also banning conventicles—defined as private
religious meetings of over five persons beyond immediate
family64—altogether.65 Test Acts were designed, in turn, to exclude
“nonconformists,” or those who would not take communion in an
established church (above all, Catholics) or swear oaths (above all,
Quakers) by imposing these as preconditions for participating in
public office and in the courts.66
This was the legal regime and political context in which the
question of religious toleration came to the forefront of public
debate in England once again in the latter part of the seventeenth
century. Proponents of toleration generally had two main policy
options in view. The first, known as “indulgence,” proposed to
repeal or suspend the penal laws punishing dissent, and thus accept
(at least informally) the existence of multiple churches alongside
the National Church.67 The second, known as “comprehension” or
“latitude,” was an irenic (literally, peace-seeking) policy that
proposed to accommodate diversity within the established Church
through creedal minimalism and sacramental inclusiveness.68 By
paring back theological orthodoxy on so-called “indifferent” matters
(adiaphora) in favor of the “fundamentals” (fundamenta) of
Christianity, those known as “latitudinarians” within the Church
of England hoped to be able to welcome dissenters back into the
fold.69 Although it is largely forgotten today, the historian
62. See SOWERBY, supra note 27, at 250.
63. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 29.
64. RICHARD LODGE, 8 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE RESTORATION
TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III, 1660–1702, at 69 (1910).
65. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 29.
66. See id. at 29–30
67. See id. at 29–31.
68. See Mark Goldie, John Locke, Jonas Proast, and Religious Toleration:
1688-1692, in THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: 1689–1833, 143, 160–61, 164 (John
Walsh et al., eds., 1993); SOWERBY, supra note 27, at 58, 174–75.
69. See Mark Goldie, The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration
England, in FROM PERSECUTION TO TOLERATION: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION
AND RELIGION IN ENGLAND 331, 332–33, 354 (Ole Peter Grell et al. eds., 1991);
see also Goldie, supra note 69, at 161, 164.
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Benjamin Kaplan argues that comprehension was thus “the most
ambitious and charitable of all forms [of toleration], requiring a
genuine acceptance of beliefs different from one’s own as valid and
a willingness to take Holy Communion with those who maintained
them.”70
Recognizing that there were two forms of toleration on offer in
the seventeenth century complicates the familiar liberal story that
recounts its ineluctable “rise.” Firstly, it reveals that the chief
proponents of accommodating religious diversity outside of the
established Church were not enlightened Whig statesmen in
Parliament, but rather the absolutist, crypto-Catholic Stuart
monarchs, Charles II and James II, both of whom issued
“Declarations of Indulgence” over Parliament’s objection and
canvassed for the repeal of its persecutory statutes.71 Secondly, it
reminds us that the Parliamentary Act of Toleration, enacted after
James II was expelled and replaced by his daughter, Mary, and her
safely Protestant husband, William of Orange, was rather a
statutory indulgence and was meant to be accompanied by a
complementary Act of Comprehension, which failed to pass.72
Actually called “An Act for Exempting their Majestyes Protestant
Subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties
of certaine Lawes” (1688, enacted 1689), the Toleration Act
suspended but did not repeal the penal laws prosecuting any
religious activity by Trinitarian Protestants outside of the
established Church.73 Catholics, Quakers, and Unitarians would
remain out of luck, and the Test Acts targeting them directly
remained on the books well into the nineteenth century.74
Needless to say, neither form of toleration on offer in the
seventeenth century proposed to disestablish the established
Church of England, nor did dissenters argue that their liberty of

70. KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 133.
71. See SOWERBY, supra note 27, at 24, 29, 58. James II also sponsored the
colonial experiment in religious diversity known as Pennsylvania, conducted
by his close friend (and Quaker) William Penn. See id. at 40.
72. Id. at 249–55.
73. See generally An Act for Exempting their Majestyes Protestant Subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties of certaine
Lawes 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 18 (Eng.), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutesrealm/vol6/pp74-76 [perma.cc/YMZ4-S9A7].
74. See KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 141.
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conscience demanded disestablishment in the form of defunding the
Church or abolishing its political, legal, economic, or symbolic
privileges. Rather, both forms of toleration (indulgence as well as
comprehension) presupposed the continued existence of an
established Church.
While the grounds on which religious
uniformity and a National Church were defended as essential
shifted over time—with secular concerns about the economic and
geopolitical benefits of Protestant unity eventually overtaking
salvific ones—eighteenth-century Whigs and Tories were generally
agreed in viewing the Church of England as an important part of
the English Constitution, although they disagreed on just how
essential a part it was.75 For example, in her 1704 pamphlet
Moderation Truly Stated, the Tory polemicist and feminist Mary
Astell inveighed against the practice of “Occasional Conformity”—
whereby dissenters took occasional communion in the Church of
England so as to be able to seek office—because it allowed
hypocritical Whigs who were not true “Friends to the Constitution”
to stand for public office. 76
Certainly, there were many critics of the established Church of
England as it existed after the Restoration, and these critics would
grow louder over time.77 In the late eighteenth century, Unitarian
ministers and theologians like Richard Price (1723–1791) and
Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) would begin to argue—with one eye
on the American colonies—that coercive taxation in support of the
religious establishment was itself a violation of dissenters’ liberty
But those who criticized the episcopal
of conscience.78
establishment as bloated, as well as bigoted, were not generally
motivated by conscience. For example, the inventor of “political
75. See Mark Knights, ‘Meer Religion’ and the ‘church-state’ of Restoration
England: the impact and ideology of James II’s declarations of indulgence, in
A NATION TRANSFORMED: ENGLAND AFTER THE RESTORATION 41, 41–42 (Alan
Craig Houston & Steve C. A. Pincus eds., 2001).
76. See MARY ASTELL, MODERATION TRULY STATED, at xlii (1704); see also
Mark Goldie, Mary Astell and John Locke, in MARY ASTELL: REASON, GENDER,
FAITH 65, 75 (William Kolbrener & Michal Michelson eds., 2007).
77. See generally J.A.I. CHAMPION, THE PILLARS OF PRIESTCRAFT SHAKEN:
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND ITS ENEMIES, 1660–1730 (1992).
78. See generally JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT AND ON THE NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(2d ed. 1771); RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY,
THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH
AMERICA (9th ed. 1776).
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arithmetic,” Sir William Petty (1623–1687) argued that the clergy
should be saddled with additional duties—including census-taking,
maintaining public records, acting as notaries, inspecting schools,
and delivering the post—in order to justify their cost.79 Beyond
overseeing public worship and maintaining church buildings, the
Church of England would remain responsible for overseeing much
of public education and poor relief in England well into the
nineteenth century.80 And even as their influence and enforcement
in the political sphere waned, religious tests remained in force in
British Universities, which continued to operate as they had for
centuries, as key credentialing bodies for the Anglican clergy.81
Nevertheless, dissenters did not seek to defund the Universities,
but rather founded their own Dissenting Academies.82
With this thoroughly establishmentarian context in mind, let
us turn now to the seventeenth-century thinkers still claimed today
as founding figures in America’s tradition of secular liberalism and
consider how they viewed the issue of establishment. As we shall
see, the arguments offered by Roger Williams and John Locke
differed greatly; neither were what modern liberals might expect.
III. THE LATRINE OF NEW ENGLAND

Given their continuing fascination with early modern
toleration debates, political theorists’ comparative lack of interest
in the early American experiments with religious coexistence
conducted by erstwhile dissenters from the Anglican Church like
Roger Williams and William Penn is surprising. For example,
Rainer Forst’s magisterial tome, Toleration in Conflict, runs over
600 pages and surveys such relatively obscure figures in the history
of toleration as Raymond Llull en route to Rawls, but barely

79. See 1 WILLIAM PETTY, THE PETTY PAPERS 141–43 (Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice ed., 1927). I am grateful to Shannon Stimson for bringing Petty’s complaints to my attention. See generally Shannon Stimson, Heterodoxy and Political Economy in Sir William Petty (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
80. See James Murphy, Religion, the State, and Education in England, 8
HIST. EDUC. Q. 3, 8–10, 28 (1968).
81. See id. at 28.
82. See IRENE PARKER, DISSENTING ACADEMIES IN ENGLAND: THEIR RISE AND
PROGRESS AND THEIR PLACE AMONG THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE COUNTRY
46–50 (1914).
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considers the “lively experiments” conducted in Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania.83
Nevertheless, the role played by English dissenters in the
colonies of British North America has long loomed large in the selfunderstanding of Americans.84 In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville
famously claimed to “see the destiny of America imbodied in the
first puritan who landed on those shores, just as the human race
was represented by the first man.”85 Yet in crediting the Pilgrims
of Plymouth Colony as the “Founders” of American democracy,
Tocqueville was repurposing a popular domestic trope for an
international audience.86 As described by the historian Sarah
Morgan Smith in honor of its 400th anniversary, the Mayflower
Compact (1620)—signed by the Puritan separatists attempting to
emigrate, unsuccessfully, from Holland to Virginia, as well as the
non-Puritan “strangers” in their midst—marked the arrival of “the
principle of religious toleration in America.”87
Of course, the cultural emphasis on the Pilgrims and the other
“Christian Utopian Closed Corporate Communit[ies]” of Puritans
that came to New England and settled in their wake, neglects the
English colonists who came before them.88 Indeed, by the time the

83. See generally RAINER FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT (2013). When
Forst discusses Williams and Penn, it is exclusively in their English contexts.
Teresa M. Bejan, What’s the use? Rainer Forst and the history of toleration, in
TOLERATION, POWER AND THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: RAINER FORST IN
DIALOGUE 23, 33–34 (Daniel Owen ed., 2020); see FORST, supra, at 182–85, 206–
08.
84. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE BARBAROUS YEARS: THE PEOPLING
OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: THE CONFLICT OF CIVILIZATIONS, 1600–1675 (2012).
85. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (Henry Reeve
trans., 4th ed. 1841).
86. See Sanford Kessler, Tocqueville’s Puritans: Christianity and the
American Founding, 54 J. POL. 776, 789–91 (1992); cf. Rufus Choate, The Age
of the Pilgrims: The Heroic Period of our History, Address to the New England
Association (1843), in 1 THE NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY ORATIONS 325, 325–26
(Cephas Brainerd & Eveline Warner Brainerd eds., 1901) (asserting that
Americans are “the children of the Pilgrims”).
87. Sarah Morgan Smith, ‘To Covenant and Combine Ourselves into a Civil
Body Politic’: The Mayflower Compact @ 400 Years, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY
(May 2020), https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/lm-smith-1620 [https://perma.
cc/UQ2W-LRAR].
88. Cf. KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS, 1636–1736, at 16–17, 165 (1970)
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Pilgrims arrived in Plymouth, the episcopal Church of England had
already been established in Virginia.89 While the ill-fated Roanoke
Colony had disappeared by 1590, Jamestown limped along from
1607.90 The contemporary Popham Colony in Maine packed up
after only a year.91 Nor were the Pilgrims the first English settlers
to be blown off course. The 1609 shipwreck that inspired
Shakespeare’s Tempest led to the settlement of Bermuda or
“Somers Isles” by English sailors.92 In 1612, the Bermudans even
signed a “compact” of their own, before the third and final Virginia
Charter brought the islands formally under Company control.93
This “Bermuda Compact,” if you will, began by declaring
subscribers’ fidelity to the Church of England and hostility to its
“dissenting” enemies: “all Atheists[,] Papists, Anabaptists,
Brownists”—i.e., separatist congregationalists like the Pilgrims
themselves—“and all other Heretiques and Sectaries whatsoever,
dissenting from the said [Anglican] Word and Faith.”94
(focusing on puritan origins of a New England town and casting its history as
illustrative of “much of early America”).
89. William H. Seiler, The Church of England as the Established Church
in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 15 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 478, 482 (1949).
90. See generally KATHLEEN DONEGAN, SEASONS OF MISERY: CATASTROPHE
AND COLONIAL SETTLEMENT IN EARLY AMERICA, 21–116 (2014).
91. Christopher J. Bilodeau, The Paradox of Sagadahoc: The Popham Colony, 1607–1608, 12 EARLY AM. STUD. 1, 1 (2014).
92. Charles Frey, The Tempest and the New World, 30 Shakespeare Q. 29,
29 (1979) (examining the influence of new world settlement on Shakespeare’s
play); J. Maxwell Greene, Bermuda (alias Somers Islands). Historical Sketch,
33 BULL. AM. GEOGRAPHICAL SOC’Y 220, 223–26 (1901) (charting early English
settlement of Bermuda).
93. J.S. MALOY, THE COLONIAL AMERICAN ORIGINS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT 90 (2008).
94. SILVESTER JOURDAIN, A PLAINE DESCRIPTION OF THE BARMVDAS, NOW
CALLED SOMMER ILANDS 23 (1613) (spelling modernized). The second article
pledged to keep the Sabbath holy, and the third turned to political matters as
emphatically secondary to spiritual. Id. The Bermudans pledged to “li[v]e together in doing that which is [j]ust, both towards God and Man . . . and to
avoide [sic] all things that stand not with the good estate of a Christian Church
and well go[v]erned Commonwealth.” Id. at 23–24. Jourdain, a merchant, was
among the sailors shipwrecked in 1609. Teresa M. Bejan, The 1612 Project, at
n.7, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY (May 27, 2020), https://oll.libertyfund.
org/page/lm-smith-1620#lm-smith-1620_footnote_r3_06_ref
[https://perma.
cc/8J5H-ZVLT#response3]. This pamphlet reprinted his earlier narrative, A
Discovery of the Barmudas, along with supplementary material (including the
text of the Bermuda Agreement as an appendix), the authorship of which is
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Nor, apart from those in Plymouth and Salem, were the
Puritan churches founded in New England actually independent.
Rather, their removal to the New World saved Puritan immigrants
the trouble of making a formal separation from the Church of
England, thus allowing for a kind of “comprehension” at a distance.
Members of the Boston Church, for instance, remained
communicants in the Church of England, and so could and would
attend their parish churches when back in Old World.95 As this
arrangement attests, transatlantic traffic (including repeat
voyages) was more common in the seventeenth century than
modern observers often realize. It was the continued imbrication of
the Boston Church with the episcopal establishment back home
that ultimately catapulted an obscure Puritan minister, Roger
Williams, on his colonial adventures. Indeed, the failure of the New
English churches on the whole to separate served as a crucial
negative exemplar when Williams came to “establish” his own
colony and its institutions.
The story of Williams’s banishment from Massachusetts Bay is
fairly well known.96 Like many Puritans, Williams left England in
the 1630s not only because he wanted to flee the rising tide of
persecution with the Church of England under Archbishop Laud,
but because he had had enough of living in a society of sinners and
wanted to try a society of “saints.”97 Inspired by the Puritan lawyer
and first Governor of Massachusetts Bay, John Winthrop, Williams
believed that Boston would prove to be a “city on a hill,” in which
the righteous might live among the like-minded as models of
Christian charity to the “unregenerate.”98 But Williams was soon

uncertain. Id. at n.7. For a more detailed discussion of the Bermuda Agreement compared with the Mayflower Compact, see id.
95. See The Road to Banishment, in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER
WILLIAMS: 1629–1653, at 12, (Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., 1988) (editorial note).
96. See generally PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO
THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1963). For a more recent and detailed account, see
generally BARRY, supra note 22.
97. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 38–41; see also EDMUND S. MORGAN,
VISIBLE SAINTS: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA 113 (1963) (“The English emigrants to New England were the first Puritans to restrict membership in the
church to visible saints, to persons, that is, who had felt the stirrings of grace
in their souls . . . .”).
98. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, preface (unpaginated); see also John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630), in 7 COLLECTIONS OF THE
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disappointed. Upon his arrival in 1631, he refused to take a
position as teacher in the Boston Church when he realized that it
was still formally unseparated from the Church of England.99
Things went downhill from there.
As Williams settled down in Massachusetts Bay, he turned his
gift for learning languages to mastering the local Algonquin
dialects to aid his independent missionary efforts among the local
tribes.100 Through his “American” associates, Williams began to
see the “unchristian Christians” of New England as hypocrites,
ostentatiously crying out against others’ sins, while living on land
that they had stolen from the natives in the name of Christianity—
a ruse Williams saw as worthy of the Anti-Christ (i.e., the Pope)
himself.101
According to his contemporaries, Williams’s radical views on
Native American land rights were not his only “offensive”
opinions.102 In addition to floating the suggestion that women
should wear veils (in keeping with St. Paul’s counsel in 1 Cor. 11:6),
his Separatist preaching apparently led supporters to deface an
English flag by cutting out the cross of St. George.103 Cotton
Mather would later claim that Williams had once “insisted
vehemently upon the unlawfulness of calling any unregenerate man
by the name of good-man such an one,” as was the Puritan
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 32, 47 (3d ser. 1838) (“[W]ee shall be as a
citty upon a hill.”).
99. The Road to Banishment, supra note 95, at 12–13.
100. See generally Teresa M. Bejan, ‘When the Word of the Lord Runs
Freely’: Roger Williams and Evangelical Toleration, in THE LIVELY
EXPERIMENT: THE STORY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN AMERICA, FROM ROGER
WILLIAMS TO THE PRESENT 65 (Chris Beneke & Christopher S. Grenda eds.,
2015).
101. See ROGER WILLIAMS, CHRISTENINGS MAKE NOT CHRISTIANS (1645), reprinted in 14 RHODE ISLAND HISTORICAL TRACTS 8–14 (Henry Martin Dexter
ed., 1881). The earlier pamphlet in which he apparently circulated this claim
in Boston has been lost.
102. Cf. ROGER WILLIAMS, A KEY INTO THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICA 143 (R.I.
& Providence Plantations Tercentenary Comm. 5th ed. 1936) (1643) (in contrast to the perceived innocence of the local Native American tribes, Williams
accused the English of being particularly sinful, charging that “although they
have not so much to restraine them (both in respect to knowledge of God and
the Lawes of men) as the English have, yet a man shall never heare [sic] of
such crimes amongst them of robberies, murthers [sic], [and] adulteries as
amongst . . . the English”).
103. The Road to Banishment, supra note 95, at 16–17.
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custom.104 Like his opposition to the English flag or its colonial
charter, this seemingly silly objection to polite modes of address
reflected Williams’s increasing concern about the conflation of
“civil” and “spiritual” matters and powers in Massachusetts Bay.
Much like the Quakers would later, he saw the colony’s use of civil
oaths (e.g., of allegiance or in court proceedings) as a form of
compulsory religious worship in the service of the state, as well.105
All of this is to say that Roger Williams was, in the end, too
Puritan for his fellow Puritans. To the relief of parties on both
sides, he soon left Boston for the formally separated congregation
at Salem.106 But even then, Williams upheld what he saw as his
non-negotiable duty as a properly evangelical Christian to continue
to preach and publish against his Boston brethren’s errors.107
Finally, in 1635, the government of Massachusetts took the
extraordinary step of banishing Williams back to England108—at
the instigation, he believed, of John Cotton, another minister of the
Boston Church recently arrived from England.109 Williams carried
his grudge against Cotton with him into exile in the New England
wilderness, where he went in an effort to escape his sentence of
deportation.110 The “wall of separation” phrase for which Williams
would later become famous originated in his public response to
Cotton’s private letter justifying his banishment, published in
London as Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and
Answered by Roger Williams of Providence in 1644.111 He would

104. 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 9 n.3
(quoting COTTON MATHER, 1 MAGNALIA CRISTI AMERICANA 117 (Silas Andrus
1820) (1702)).
105. See Jimmy D. Neff, Roger Williams: Pious Puritan and Strict Separationist, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 529, 534 (1996).
106. The Road the Banishment, supra note 95, at 13–14.
107. See id. at 14–21; see also Linford D. Fisher, Evangelicals and Unevangelicals: The Contested History of a Word, 1500–1950, 26 RELIGION & AM.
CULTURE 184, 192–94 (2016) (examining the term “evangelical” as a connotation of true faith and noting its use during the colonial period in New England).
108. The Road to Banishment, supra note 95, at 21.
109. Letter from John Cotton, in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER
WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 31–32 (editorial note).
110. See id.
111. CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 72; ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON’S LETTER
LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED, AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 46, 70 (James Calvin Davis ed., 2008). Williams denied that he was
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continue his public campaign against Cotton at considerably
greater length in his pro-toleration treatise, The Bloudy Tenent of
Persecution.112
According to his own account, Williams received the land that
would become Providence as a gift from the Narragansett Chief
Canonicus after a hard winter’s exile among the Wampanoag.113 It
is not clear that he intended to found a colony of his own, let alone
a tolerant one. Rather, the founding of “Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations” seems to have been an accident. Williams
did not set out to lead; nevertheless, he was followed—mainly by
other religious troublemakers and exiles like Anne Hutchinson and
Samuel Gorton, both of whom later joined his plantation, much to
Williams’s chagrin.114 To say that the success of the experiment
with toleration in Rhode Island was not a foregone conclusion is an
understatement. Neighbors in New Amsterdam complained that
Williams’s colony had become the “receptacle for all sorts of riff-raff
people . . . nothing else than the sewer, (latrina) of New
England.”115
That “latrine” was also, for a time, the most tolerant society the
Rhode Island welcomed
Christian world had ever seen.116
Protestants of all stripes, as well as Jews, Muslims (at least in
theory), American “pagans,” and even Catholic “Anti-Christians” to
come and live together on terms of equal liberty, including the
liberty to proselytize for their respective faiths.117 Still, its most
the means by which Mr. Cotton’s letter found its way into print in London, but
no one believed him. Letter from John Cotton, supra note 109, at 32. Jeremy
Waldron has argued that the phrase “wall of separation” originated with the
Anglican theologian Richard Hooker, but there are reasons to doubt it.
WALDRON, supra note 24, at 208; cf. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 199.
112. CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 85–86.
113. See Jack L. Davis, Williams Among the Narragansett Indians, 43 NEW
ENG. Q. 593, 598 (1970); WILLIAMS, supra note 111, at 33.
114. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 40–41.
115. See 14 DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: ONE
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION 400 (1902).
116. Fittingly, in the Middle Ages tolerantia was understood as a policy of
permission without approval of an acknowledged, including raw sewage. See
generally István Bejczy, Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept, 58 J. HIST. IDEAS 365
(1997).
117. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1645), reprinted in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 87, 135; see BEJAN, supra
note 24, at 50–79.
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remarkable feature was the entire absence of an established church
of any denomination in Williams’s colony—what Charles II called
its “livelie experiment,” to be repeated forty years later by Penn and
James II.118 We are now also in a position to recognize the situation
in Rhode Island (and later in Pennsylvania) as one not of disestablishment, but rather non-establishment, in Laborde’s
phrase.119 Williams certainly had the opportunity to entrench the
religion of his choosing in his colony upon his arrival or in its
original 1644 Parliamentary patent, secured upon his first return
to London.120 And yet, he did not.
The fact is clear enough. But what of Williams’s theoretical
principles? Commentators usually see in Rhode Island’s nonestablishment simply the logical conclusion of Williams’
separationist views. Yet the distinction between “civil” and
“spiritual” government was, by the seventeenth century, a Calvinist
commonplace.
Even in theocratic Geneva itself, reformed
Protestants had been careful to respect the formal distinction
between the civil office and authority exercised by the city
magistrates from the spiritual authority wielded by elders of the
Church.121 Nor does non-establishment appear to have been a
straightforward consequence of Williams’s commitment to the
liberty of conscience. He had little patience for those who, like the
Quakers, would plead conscience to avoid “pay[ing] their freight”—
i.e., taxes—whenever the “commander of the ship [of state]” deemed
it necessary for their “justice, peace, and sobriety.”122
Rather, Williams’s chief concern remained, as always, to ward
off the spiritual “pollution” that came from mixing religion and
politics, just as Bostonians worshipping in their parish churches in
England brought the contagion of Catholic “Anti-Christianity” back
with them. It is well-known among jurists that Williams’s purpose
118. Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations - July 15, 1663,
LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ri
04.asp [perma.cc/LR6R-32V6] (last visited Apr. 2, 2021); see also Sally
Schwartz, William Penn and the Toleration: Foundations of Colonial Pennsylvania, 50 J. MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 284, 284–86 (1983).
119. See LABORDE, supra note 8, at 71–72.
120. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 59.
121. See generally PHILIP S. GORSKI, THE DISCIPLINARY REVOLUTION:
CALVINISM AND THE RISE OF THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2003).
122. Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (Jan. 1655)
(Ship of State Letter), in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 278, 279.
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in restoring “the hedge or wall of separation between the Garden of
the church and the wilderness of the world” was to keep the garden
safe—i.e., to protect religion from the corrupting effects of
politics.123 Still, the finer points of Williams’s argument are often
lost when considered apart from the thoroughly establishmentarian
context in which they were made.
When Williams arrived back in London in 1644 to seek a patent
for his fledgling colony, he found himself in the midst of a Civil War.
The hated episcopal hierarchy was under attack, and the Long
Parliament had convened a special commission of theologians—the
Westminster Assembly of Divines—to discuss a new form of
government for the National Church.124 In his follow-up to Mr.
Cottons Letter Lately Printed, Williams published his Queries of
Highest Consideration, addressed to Parliament as well as to
Presbyterian and Independent factions within the Assembly.125 In
this brief pamphlet, Williams reassured Parliament that:
[C]oncerning souls, we will not (as most do) charge you with
the loads of all the souls in England, Scotland, [and]
Ireland. We shall humbly affirm and (by the help of Christ)
maintain that the bodies and goods of the subject [are] your
charge [but] their souls (and yours) are set on account to
[others].126
Here, we catch a glimpse of the social contract theory that Williams
later made explicit in The Bloudy Tenent, which grounded political
power in “the people’s choice and free consent,” and consequently
limited its exercise to “the common-wealth or safety of such a people
in their bodies and goods.”127
But Williams’s case against establishment was for the most
part theological, as well as historical. In freeing Parliament from
the care of subjects’ souls, he reminded them of the utter hash
previous governments had made of it, “what setting up, pulling
123. E.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 48–53; see
WILLIAMS, supra note 111, at 70 (separation of the mundane and divine ensured
the garden would “be walled . . . from the world”).
124. ROBERT ASHTON, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: CONSERVATISM AND
REVOLUTION, 1603–1649, at 218–19 (1978).
125. See Roger Williams, Queries of Highest Consideration, in ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 73.
126. Id. at 75.
127. WILLIAMS, supra note 117, at 148.
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down, what formings, reformings, and again deformings” had
reigned ecclesiastically in England over the past century, by which
“[t]he fathers made the children heretics, and the children the
fathers.”128 Not only did this suggest that civil magistrates lacked
privileged access when it came to religious truth, to put it mildly, it
also suggested that a puritan Parliament should be glad to free
itself of the spiritual “[s]upremacy . . . . [o]f which power King
Henry, upon a grudge (as ‘tis said) about his wife, despoiled the
pope and with consent and act of Parliament sat down himself in
the pope’s chair in England.”129 Moreover, Williams argued, in
insisting upon retaining that power, Presbyterians and
Independents within the Westminster Assembly were alike
attempting “a reviving of Moses, and the sanctifying of a new Land
of Canaan, of which we hear nothing in the Testament of Christ
Jesus.”130
Here, we see clearly the same charge of unwholesome
Hebraizing that Williams would level at Cotton and other
“unchristian Christians” of New England.131 To speak at all of a
“national” church, sounded to Williams’s ears like a denial of
Christ’s coming, whereby the old covenant of Israel had given way
to the new covenant of universal grace.132 This denial would swiftly
bring persecution in its train:
[How could] the constitution of a national church . . .
possibly be framed without a racking and tormenting of the
souls, as well as of the bodies, of persons. For it seems not
possible to fit it to every conscience; sooner shall one suit of
apparel fit every body [sic], one law [preside over] every
case, or one size . . . every foot!133

128. Williams, supra note 126, at 75, 77.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 77.
131. See WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 8–14. For the popularity of “Hebraic”
political theorizing in this period, see generally ERIC NELSON, THE HEBREW
REPUBLIC: JEWISH SOURCES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (2010).
132. Williams, supra note 125, at 78–79.
133. Id.
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One recognizes here the boggling mind of a man practically
acquainted with the religious diversity of his own colonial
backwater.
When it came to the matter of state funding for religion, in
particular, Williams was concerned less about conscience than
corruption. In inveighing against so-called “hirelings”—that is,
religious ministers trained and employed by the state—Williams
was in good company with his friend, John Milton, who likewise
detailed the distorting effects of government pay and discipline on
those ostensibly committed to religious truth.134 Forced to return
to London in 1652 in search of second colonial patent (the first being
made void by Charles I’s decapitation), Williams once more
embroiled himself in the ecclesiastical controversies of his
homeland.135 In The Hireling Ministry None of Christ’s, Williams
objected to the proposed reintroduction of tithes by the English
Commonwealth on the grounds that a state-supported ministry
encouraged ministers to “mak[e] a trade of preaching” and render
“the cure of souls and the charge of men’s eternal welfare . . . a
maintenance and living,” which was necessarily unchristian and
corrupting.136 The Gospel had been given by God to mankind in
general, and should be freely given by Christians to those who had
not yet been saved, in turn. Moreover, the public Universities
charged with training and ordaining this ministry of servile
hypocrites simply encouraged them in a “monkish and idle course
of life, partly so genteel and stately, partly so vain and
superstitious, that to wet a finger in any pains or labor is a
disgraceful and unworthy act.”137
As a Cambridge graduate himself, Williams maintained that
he was a lover of humane learning for its own sake; nevertheless,
he insisted that the “sacrilegious and superstitious degrees (as they
call them) in the profession of divinity” granted by Universities
simply encouraged the hireling ministry in its Pharisaical
134. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 23 (Global Grey 2018) (1644) (“I hate
a pupil teacher, I endure not an instructor that comes to me under the wardship of an overseeing fist.”).
135. See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams’ Gift: Religious Freedom in
America, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 436 (1999).
136. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING MINISTRY NONE OF CHRIST’S (1652), reprinted in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 249, 254.
137. Id. at 254–55.
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pretenses.138 In attacking the Universities in this way, Williams
was taking aim squarely at the best means currently available to
Cromwell and the Commonwealth (given the collapse of the
Westminster Assembly’s negotiations years before139) of
maintaining the state’s authority and discipline over the clergy
through a regime of licensing and regulation. In 1652, Williams
also published his objections to the so-called Humble Proposals
presented to the Rump Parliament by the Independent minister
John Owen.140 Owen had been inspired, in part, by John Cotton’s
1644 account of the New England way in The Keyes to the Kingdom
of Heaven and the Power thereof according to the Word of God.141
Williams was evidently not the only New Englander hoping to
influence the settlement of ecclesiastical affairs in his homeland.
In his critique of the Humble Proposals, Williams objected
specifically to Owen’s proposed process of civil “approval,”
regulation, and state-licensing for preachers, as well as the
supplementary system of “Triers and Ejectors” meant to discipline
the Universities that trained ministers by expelling the
heterodox.142 Again, Williams insisted that the propagation of the
Gospel was a duty of all Christians; hence any effort by the state to
restrict “mechanic” preaching—that is, ex tempore preaching by

138. Id. at 255.
139. See David Plant, The Westminster Assembly, BCW PROJECT (Feb. 22,
2009), http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/first-civil-war/westminster-assembly [perma.cc/9PPG-2FZV].
140. Carolyn Polizzotto, The Campaign against The Humble Proposals of
1652, 38 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 569, 569 (1987); For more on Owen, see generally Manfred Svensson, John Owen and John Locke: confessionalism, doctrinal minimalism, and toleration, 43 HIST. EUROPEAN IDEAS 302 (2016).
141. See Joel R. Beeke & Randall J. Pederson, John Owen: Excerpt from
Meet the Puritans, MONERGISM, https://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/
articles/onsite/meetthepuritans/johnowen.html [perma.cc/5PRY-PRT7] (last
visited Apr. 1, 2021).
142. See BEJAN, supra note 24, at 78; see also JEFFREY R. COLLINS, THE
ALLEGIANCE OF THOMAS HOBBES 167–69 (2005) (describing the functions of the
“Triers and Ejectors” as a tool for “suppressing political dissent”); Jeffrey R.
Collins, The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell, 87 HISTORY 18, 38–40
(2002) (arguing that the state church under Cromwell should not be seen as
part of the “nascent tolerationist and pluralist” thought budding elsewhere in
religious debate).
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those without a University education—was an unacceptable
restriction of their evangelical liberty.143
In these later pamphlets, Williams’s complete theory of
ecclesiastical deregulation as a requirement of true Christianity
comes more fully into view. Individual Christians must be free to
preach and propagate the Gospel, to associate freely with others to
that end, and to elect and employ their own ministers, in turn,
without fear or favor from either the state or any other church. This
platform of de-regulation will be familiar to modern Americans as
a “free market” in religion of the kind imagined by James Madison,
under the influence perhaps of American Baptists like Isaac
Backus, one in which rival churches could compete for converts like
firms for customers.144
The association is strengthened when one considers Williams’s
famous definition of a church in The Bloudy Tenent, as a “company
of worshippers . . . like [unto] a corporation, society, or company of
East India or Turk[ey] merchants, or any other society or company
in London.”145 Williams elaborated:
These companies may hold their courts, keep their records,
hold disputations, and in matters concerning their society
may dissent, divide, break into schisms and factions, sue
and implead each other at the law, yea wholly break up and
dissolve into pieces . . . and yet the peace of the city not be
in the least measure impaired or disturbed—because the
essence or being of the city . . . is essentially distinct from
those particular societies, the city-courts, city-laws, citypunishments distinct from theirs. The city was before
them and stands absolute and entire when such a
corporation or society is taken down.146
In this passage, one hears the echo of Williams’s childhood in
London as the son of a merchant-tailor. One also hears the voice of
a man grateful that the city of Providence had yet withstood the
sectarian impulses of its citizens, including Williams himself.

143.
(1979).
144.
145.
146.

See W. CLARK GILPIN, THE MILLENARIAN PIETY OF ROGER WILLIAMS 84
See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 208; see generally RAKOVE, supra note 19.
WILLIAMS, supra note 117, at 98.
Id.
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But when it comes to the theory of religious association behind
Williams’s definition of a church, these practical and economic
experiences gave way to his emphatically evangelical and sectarian
vision of Protestant Christianity. Williams’s market metaphor
denied the long-standing “corporal” conception of the church as the
body of Christ, common to both Catholics and Protestants, in favor
of a “corporate” one that clearly presupposed the supremacy of civil
law and courts over church governance, as well as the lay and local
control of congregations as registered corporations, instead of that
of an ordained ministry and national (or international)
hierarchy.147 Both features of Williams’s definition would have
been anathema to most seventeenth-century Protestants, who
expected ministers to be “bred” at Oxford or Cambridge,148 as
Williams himself had been.149 But of course, Williams never joined
a Protestant church he could not (and did not) leave in a hurry—
including the first Baptist congregation in New England.150
Offending his fellow Christians came naturally.
If asked, then, whether America is a Christian nation today,
Williams would answer¾“no.” Nations were, for him, by definition
fallen communities that brought regenerate and unregenerate
Christians together, along with non-Christian “infidels,” in a single
ship of state. For one “must go out of the world, in case we may not
keep company in civil converse with idolaters.”151 One must be
careful, then, not to conflate the boundaries and standards of
membership between the “wilderness” of the worldly city and the
“garden” of the true church. The former should be governed by the
standard of “mere civility” in this lifetime, the latter by “spiritual
goodness” and truly Christian charity in this and in the life to
come.152
Still, a supreme irony remains: in failing to establish a church
in Providence, Roger Williams inadvertently established his own
evangelical and sectarian religion. Insofar as the First Amendment
enacted this distinctly American vision of church-state relations on
147. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 116–17.
148. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 6-8.
149. CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 29.
150. See id. at 64.
151. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION 116 (Samuel L.
Caldwell ed., Narragansett Club 1867) (1644) (spelling modernized).
152. See BEJAN, supra note 24, 50–81.
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the national level, its critics are right to point out that its effect is
not one of dis-establishment at all, but rather of the inadvertent
establishment of evangelical Protestantism as a matter of law, an
establishment to which we do, indeed, still expect all other religions
and churches to conform. As Rakove points out, American law in
the nineteenth century developed in a de-regulatory direction
which treated churches as corporations in precisely Williams’ sense,
so that even the Catholic church was forced to accommodate itself
to local incorporation and lay control.153
IV. LOCKE’S LAST STAND

Where does this leave John Locke? Scholars sometimes read
Locke’s 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration as though it were a
blessedly abbreviated and less overtly scriptural second draft of
Williams’s Bloudy Tenent.154 This push to acknowledge his
predecessors is, in part, the result of a concerted revisionist effort
by historians to counteract the “Locke Obsession” that has long
dominated histories of toleration and liberalism.155 Rakove
describes the Letter “as a postscript to a debate that had largely run
its course.”156
Recently, however, the political theorist Andrew Murphy has
argued that originality is overrated as a virtue of political thinkers
in any case, whether in the case of Locke or William Penn.157 The
former certainly brought theoretical clarity and practical precision,
if not wit, to the arguments others had made before him, thereby
creating the commonsensical case for toleration for generations of
153. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 117; see generally Sarah Barringer Gordon,
The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and Property Before the
Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 308–12 (2014); Sarah Barringer Gordon, Religious Corporations and Disestablishment 1780–1840, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 63 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë
Robinson eds., 2016).
154. See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN
AMERICA 196 (1991).
155. John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman, Introduction to BEYOND
PERSECUTING SOCIETY: RELIGIOUS TOLERATION BEFORE THE
THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 1, 2–3 (John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman eds.,
1998).
156. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 34.
157. ANDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND TOLERATION: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN 81 (2016).
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liberal political theorists to come.158 Locke certainly exercised a
more direct influence on the First Amendment than Roger Williams
ever did. This occurred through the medium of Madison’s close
friend and colleague, Thomas Jefferson. Rakove describes how, in
preparation for a 1776 meeting of the Virginia House of Delegates
set to consider several petitions in favor of disestablishing the
Church of England in that state, Jefferson read and made copious
notes on his copy of Locke’s Letter, including the tantalizing
observation: “It was a great thing to go so far (as he himself sais
[sic] of the parl[iament] who framed the act of toler[atio]n) . . . but
where he stopped short, we may go on.”159
Even so, Locke’s Letter went pretty far. Consider its preface
“To the Reader,” which declared: “It is neither Declarations of
Indulgence, nor Acts of Comprehension, such as have yet been
practised [sic] or projected amongst us . . . . [t]he first will but
palliate, the second increase our Evil.”160 Rather, “Absolute Liberty,
Just and True Liberty, Equal and Impartial Liberty, is the thing
that we stand in need of.”161 Here we find a ringing endorsement
of evangelical liberty—and rejection of “mere” toleration—beyond
anything Williams ever wrote. The only problem is, of course, that
Locke did not write it either. For as Jefferson himself did not
realize, nor have many commentators since, the Letter’s preface was
written not by Locke himself, but by his friend and translator
William Popple (1638–1708)—a figure who has yet to receive his
due from intellectual historians.162
Popple had been a wine merchant, based in Bordeaux with his
family, before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV
in 1685 put an end to the formal toleration of Protestantism in

158. For the latest version of this argument, see generally JOHN WILLIAM
TATE, LIBERTY, TOLERATION AND EQUALITY: JOHN LOCKE, JONAS PROAST AND THE
LETTERS CONCERNING TOLERATION (2016).
159. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 4 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Locke
and Shaftesbury, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760–1776, at 544,
548 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)).
160. William Popple, Preface to JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER
WRITINGS 3, 4 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010).
161. Id.
162. The one notable exception is Caroline Robbins, Absolute Liberty: The
Life and Thought of William Popple, 1638–1708, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 190 (1967).
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France.163 He was able to return to England only with difficulty,
possibly through Penn’s personal intervention with James II.164 By
the time he undertook to translate Locke’s Letter—written
originally in Latin in 1685 as an Epistola de Tolerantia165—Popple
had published his own A Rational Catechism, as well as the
exhaustively titled Three Letters tending to Demonstrate how the
Security of this Nation against all Future Persecution for Religion,
lys in the Abolishment of the Present Penal Laws . . . and the
Establishment of a New Law for Universal Liberty of Conscience.166
As this title suggests, Popple was already on record as viewing mere
“indulgence” as insufficient.
Recalling the place of Popple in what we know today as Locke’s
Letter reminds us also of the conditions under which the original
Epistola de Tolerantia was produced. Like Popple, Locke was in
Europe at the Revocation; but unlike Popple, he was safe in the
Netherlands when the Edict was revoked.167 There, Locke
witnessed the arrival of countless Huguenots “refugees” (from the
French refugiez) fleeing persecution.168 He appears to have written
the original Epistola at the request of his friend Philipp van
Limborch, a Dutch theologian and professor in Amsterdam.169
Despite its seemingly quintessential Englishness, then, Locke’s
Letter was written originally in Latin for a European audience and
addressed to the problems of international Protestantism, rather
than in English for dissenters seeking toleration for themselves
either outside of or within an established National Church.
Indeed, before he fled England as a suspected terrorist in
1683—when several of his friends were discovered behind the Rye
House Plot to assassinate Charles II along with his openly Catholic
brother, James170—Locke had been notoriously lukewarm on

163. Id. at 191–92.
164. Id. at 203–04.
165. Mark Goldie, Introduction to A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND
OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at ix, xi.
166. Robbins, supra note 162, at 190–91.
167. 2 ERIC MACK, JOHN LOCKE 10 (John Meadowcroft ed., 2013).
168. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 127.
169. Svensson, supra note 140, at 308.
170. Philip Milton, John Locke and the Rye House Plot, 43 HIST. J. 647, 649,
666–67 (2000).
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toleration.171 His early unpublished Tracts on Government (c.
1660–2), written while a young scholar at Oxford, reflected his
rather enthusiastic embrace of Hobbes’s arguments in Leviathan
(1651) in favor of a formally intolerant, albeit latitudinarian,
establishment in service to the state.172 A visit to Cleves in 1665
apparently convinced Locke that peaceful coexistence between
those who differed in religion was at least possible.173 Still, his
1667 Essay Concerning Toleration endorsed comprehension (or
“latitudinism”) as the preferred course:
[T]oleration conduces no otherwise to the settlement of a
government than as it makes the majority of one mind and
encourages virtue in all, which is done by . . . making the
terms of church communion as large as may be, i.e., that
your articles in speculative opinions be few and large, and
ceremonies in worship few and easy.174
Once achieved, a supplementary indulgence could accommodate
any non-Christians and “fanatics” who remained of necessity
outside the National Church.
Needless to say, Locke would later change his tune and
embrace toleration as a matter of right for Christians and nonChristians alike. Still, one must be careful not to lose sight of
Popple’s hand in the Letter’s more radical moments. Consider its
famous definition of a church as “a voluntary Society of Men, joining
themselves together of their own accord,” like other private
associations of “Philosophers for Learning, of Merchants for
Commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual Conversation and

171. MACK, supra note 167, at 10. For a comprehensive treatment of Locke’s
intellectual development on the issue of toleration, see generally JOHN
MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE, TOLERATION AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE
(2006).
172. See BEJAN, supra note 24, at 115–20. For more on Locke’s early Hobbism, see generally JEFFREY R. COLLINS, IN THE SHADOW OF LEVIATHAN: JOHN
LOCKE AND THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE (2020).
173. Letter from John Locke to Robert Boyle (Dec. 12, 1665), in 1 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 227, 228 (E. S. De Beer ed., 1976).
174. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION (1667), reprinted in A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at 105,
131–32.
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Discourse.”175 Later in the Letter, the motives drawing men
together in churches are compared with those seeking “Company
for Trade and Profit: [or] Others, for want of Business, [who] have
their Clubs for Clarret.”176 But the “Clarret” line was Popple’s,
evidently inspired by his own experiences as a wine merchant (and
likely oenophile).177
Locke’s own examples of philosophical
societies and clubs for conversation among men of leisure were
more edifying and high-minded on the whole.178
Locke’s definition of a church is often compared to Williams’s
in The Bloudy Tenent, but notice that the emphasis in the former
was on the private and informal nature of the association between
individuals in search of the joys of “company,” rather than the legal
incorporation of a company that might therefore own and alienate
property, make contracts, and press claims in a court of law.
Although both implied an equally radical transformation when it
came to the traditional, corporal understanding of membership in
the Christian church—instead of being a “member” of the body of
Christ, like a hand or a foot, the individual becomes a voluntary
“member” of a private club—the privacy of Locke’s spiritual
associations was, crucially, consistent with the persistence of a
properly public form of worship.
More fundamentally, in Locke one can recognize the
development of the modern private sphere—as a conceptual and
physical space in which individuals freely associated with one
another on the basis of their particular beliefs and interests—as an
intellectual and institutional emanation of public religion.179 And

175. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at 7,
15–16 (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 56.
177. See Notes on the Texts, in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND
OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at xxix, xxxi.
178. Popple himself was a member of one such Lockean association, the unprepossessingly named “Dry Club.” MARSHALL, supra note 171, at 519. Perhaps he was trying to send Locke a message with his translation?
179. Cf. Abizadeh, supra note 26, at 264–65 (“[A] key social and ideological
function of the emerging private sphere in the early modern period was, rather
than to protect diversity, to make public uniformity possible.”). For a systematic treatment of the emergence of the concept of privacy, see generally Russell
Bogue, Privacy: A Political Approach (2020) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Oxford) (on file with the University of Oxford Libraries).
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yet, many scholars nonetheless infer a “Lockean” commitment to
disestablishment in the Letter. Rakove, for example, cites his
insistence that:
No body [sic] is born a Member of any Church. Otherwise
the Religion of Parents would descend unto Children, by
the same right of Inheritance as their Temporal Estates,
and every one would hold his Faith by the same Tenure he
does his Lands; than which nothing can be imagined more
absurd.180
Or even more resolutely, that “there is absolutely no such thing,
under the Gospel, as a Christian Commonwealth.”181 Not even
Williams could (or did) say it better.
Certainly, there is a principle of separation implied here. But
of what? “Church” and “State,” yes, but in what sense? In Locke,
as in Williams, the emphasis remains on “churches” and “civil
societies” as distinct forms of community—the former voluntary,
the latter involuntary—each with its different standards of
membership. Locke is more emphatic than Williams that an
individuals’ civil rights must not depend on church membership,
but then again, he was writing in a European context facing a rising
tide of Protestant refugees to countries that already had their own
public Protestant churches.182 Yet like Williams, Locke looked
beyond the confines of Protestant Christianity to imagine the
implications of his arguments for other kinds of difference: “Nay if
we may openly speak the Truth and as becomes one Man to another;
neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from
the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his Religion.”183
This is, at first blush, a toleration of truly Williams-esque largesse.
Still, it does not seem that Locke’s understanding of separation
demanded the disestablishment of public churches in the way that
many modern readers assume. Despite his heterodoxy, Locke
himself remained a communicating member of the Church of
England all of his life.184 While this was initially a matter of
180. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 15; see RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 46.
181. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 42.
182. For background, see generally HAEFELI, supra note 27.
183. See LOCKE, supra note 175, at 15.
184. See Samuel C. Pearson, Jr., The Religion of John Locke and the Character of His Thought, 58 J. RELIGION 244, 245, 256, 260 (1978).
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compulsion, after the Act of Toleration suspended punishments for
non-attendance and non-conformity, it became a matter of choice.
And for Locke, individual choice—not disestablishment—had
always been the point.185 The familiar picture of Locke as a
political radical and would-be revolutionary in exile thus distracts
from the fact that by the time the Letter was published—in the
same year as his celebrated Essay Concerning Human
Understanding and the (anonymous) Two Treatises of
Government—Locke was back in London and well on his way to
bureaucratic respectability.186
Over the next fifteen years, until his death in 1704, Locke
would become a distinguished public servant,187 one who evidently
used his position on the Board of Trade and Plantations to secure a
place for Popple as its secretary.188 As a respectable bureaucrat,
Locke counted many latitudinarian clergymen among his friends
and acquaintances, above all the Bishop of Salisbury, Gilbert
Burnet.189 In his long-running controversy with the conservative
clergyman Jonas Proast in defense of the original Letter, Locke
recommended Burnet’s Pastoral Care (1692) as a model of clerical
moderation.190 Locke’s campaign against Proast would produce
three more Letters on Toleration (the last of which remained
unfinished at his death), in which some combination of toleration
outside of and comprehension within the Church of England
remained his preferred policy arrangement.191

185. Cf. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 15 (“[T]he Power of Civil Government
relates only to Mens [sic] Civil Interests; is confined to the care of the things of
this World; and hath nothing to do with the World to come.”).
186. See MACK, supra note 167, at 10.
187. R.S. WOOLHOUSE, LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 361–419 (2007).
188. Robbins, supra note 162, at 210.
189. See Tony Claydon, Latitudinarianism and Apocalyptic History in the
Worldview of Gilbert Burnet, 1643–1715, 51 THE HIST. J. 577, 580 (2008).
190. JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION (1692), reprinted in A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at 69,
95.
191. See Goldie, supra note 68, at 143. In a letter to Limborch, Locke identified both as forms of toleration—“The former signifies extension of the boundaries of the Church, with a view to including greater numbers by the removal
of part of the ceremonies,” while “the latter signifies toleration of those who
are either unwilling or unable to unite themselves to the Church of England
on the terms offered to them.” Letter from John Locke to Phillipus van
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In this preference, Locke himself was clearly much less radical
than Williams or Popple. And recognizing this fact, in turn, allows
us to make sense of—rather than apologize for or explain away—
the Letter’s more uncomfortable features, above all its implicit
exclusion of Roman Catholics from toleration (via an analogy to the
followers of the “Mufti of Constantinople”), as well as the explicit
exclusion of atheists (for “the taking away of God, though but even
in thought, dissolves all”).192 Both suggest that while Locke was
straightforwardly opposed to penal laws and wanted to break the
Church of England’s monopoly on public worship, he nonetheless
accepted the use of Test Acts and civil oaths as a means of ensuring
that only those who supported this “tolerant” ecclesiastical
settlement could participate fully as equals in public life. That
there would still be a role for the state in regulating religion is
further evidenced by Locke’s insistence that only those churches
that “own and teach the Duty of tolerating All men in matters of
meer [sic] Religion” have the right to be tolerated themselves.193
This is not simply a theoretical claim, that the intolerant have
themselves no claim to toleration194; rather, in the context of
seventeenth-century English establishment, Locke’s statement
implies an ongoing need for policing by the state of both religious
doctrine and personnel.
In Mere Civility, I highlighted the role that the idea of trust or
fides plays in Locke’s political theory, and how for him, that trust
was predicated on a set of shared beliefs—in the existence of God,
for example, and of rewards and punishments in the afterlife—as
the foundation of any mutually tolerable civil society.195 Here, I
want to emphasize how Locke’s sense of a profound need for this
minimal, but necessarily creedal, kind of conformity complemented
his conviction that established churches and their clergy might yet
have an important role to play in tolerant societies, as models of
moral virtue and “reasonable” religion for others.196 For example,
Limborch (Mar. 12, 1689), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 582, 584
(E.S. de Beer ed., 1978).
192. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 52–53.
193. Id. at 51.
194. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 191–93 (rev. ed. 1999).
195. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 136–38.
196. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 180 (George W.
Ewing ed., Regnery Gateway 1989) (1695) (a basic faith and acceptance of

2021]

IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

323

even in the Letter itself, the civil magistrate retains a hortatory role
as an evangelist with superior resources with which to extol the
virtues of true Christianity.197
Historians of American law and religion have noted the
emergence of an informal “moral” or “indirect establishment” in
nineteenth century America, despite the First Amendment, in the
form of religious tests, temperance campaigns, bible reading in
schools, and Sabbatarian legislation.198 In the 1690s, Locke
likewise favored the public campaigns against vice associated with
the so-called “Reformation of Manners,” led by latitudinarian
bishops like Burnet.199 Locke’s notorious 1697 Essay on the Poor
Law argued that children caught begging should be sent to public
“working schools” wherein they might be made to “come constantly
to church every Sunday,” because “their idle and loose way of
breeding up [made them] as utter strangers both to religion and
morality as they are to industry.”200 And, as the political theorist
Jack Turner has shown, Locke approved and facilitated statesupported missionary efforts among the American Indians in his

gospel “suits the lowest capacities of reasonable creatures” so that society may
function with the morals necessary to disabuse its citizens of “any conceits, any
wrong rules, [and] anything tending to their own self-interest . . . in their morality”).
197. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 13–14; cf. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN
THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT
EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 21 (2012) (“Rights such as freedom of expression correctly protect citizens against coercive intervention, but I argue
that these rights do not extend to a right not to be persuaded by the state.”).
198. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 122; compare STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND
DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
149–205 (2010) (outlining how Christian-majority sentiments policed minorities through the law in the nineteenth century), and Jud Campbell, Testimonial Exclusions and Religious Freedom in Early America, 37 LAW & HIST. REV.
431, 431–92 (2019) (focusing particularly on the inability for non-Christians to
testify in courts of law).
199. See WILLIAM J. BULMAN, ANGLICAN ENLIGHTENMENT: ORIENTALISM,
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND AND ITS EMPIRE, 1648–1715, at 254–55
(2015); Karen Sonnelitter, The Reformation of Manners Societies, the Monarchy, and the English State, 1696–1714, 72 HISTORIAN 517, 518–20 (2010).
200. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY ON THE POOR LAW (1697), reprinted in POLITICAL
ESSAYS 182, 191–92 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997).
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capacity as a member of the Board of Trade and Plantations of the
kind that Williams abhorred.201
Still, there remains a crucial difference between Locke’s
version of an “indirect” moral establishment, and that favored by
Americans in the nineteenth century. Whereas the latter was led
by a mass movement of greatly “awakened” evangelical Christians,
Locke’s cultural establishment was to be the top-down work of
“reasonable” gentlemen—government bureaucrats like himself,
along with latitudinarian clergymen like Burnet—who might model
civility and moderation for others while acting as moral censors
from their institutional perches in parish churches and
Universities, or any other non-governmental yet representatively
“public” institutions overseen and supported by the state.202
All of this should remind us that there is quite a lot of space
between Roger Williams’s radical commitment to religious
deregulation, both in New England and Old, and Locke’s more
moderate establishmentarian vision of reform. Asked whether
America is a Christian nation, Locke might respond, then, that it
is—and that it is foolhardy for any Christian nation not to maintain
an irenic and liberal “establishment” in its public institutions, one
sufficient to moderate the nation’s more intolerant impulses.
Whereas Williams’s inadvertent establishment of evangelical
Protestantism dismantled the dynamic of dissent, Locke’s informal
establishment of liberal Protestantism preserved it. Religious nonconformity would and should be legalized; yet there should also
remain an established church around which individuals and private
associations might or might not choose to conform.
V. IRENIC LIBERALISM

Keeping the contrast between Williams’s evangelical
sectarianism and Locke’s irenic liberal Protestantism in mind, we
are now in a position to see—contrary to the contemporary critics
of liberalism considered in the introduction—that not all
sublimated Protestantisms are created equal. We are also in a
201. See Jack Turner, John Locke, Christian Mission, and Colonial America, 8 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 267, 275 (2011).
202. For an American version of Locke’s ecclesiastical establishment in the
form of Thomas Jefferson’s visions of a public university, see RAKOVE, supra
note 19, at 161–62 (in Jefferson’s view, “the point of education . . . was to enable
children to reach an age when they would be capable of ascertaining their own
norms of religious truth or faith”).
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position to appreciate better the long shadow that these early
modern debates cast over the way that we continue to think and
speak about religious difference in the United States today—not
only in academia, but in the broader public sphere.
For example, the conceptual presuppositions of a religious
establishment—whether evangelical or irenic—can be seen in the
“parochial” vocabulary employed by political theorists to this day,
which continues to bear tell-tale traces of the statist-confessional
English ecclesiastical context, without a compensatory awareness
of the tensions this context sometimes produces in our theories.
The basic liberal model of toleration as the accommodation of
“dissent”—whether of individuals singly or collectively in voluntary
association with others—presupposes a consensus; while the term
“disestablishment” applies properly only to contexts wherein there
had formerly been an established Church.203
Indeed, it is hard to exaggerate the lasting cultural impact of
the English tradition of dissenting Protestantism on modern
liberalism, beginning with John Stuart Mill.204 It is evident in the
continued liberal valorization of dissent, and its elevation of the
individual dissenter or “conscientious objector” as a heroic figure,
as in Mill’s account of Socrates or Robert Bolt’s depiction of Thomas
More in A Man For All Seasons.205 In this section, I shall focus on
one paragon of American liberalism, in particular, for whom this
establishmentarian model was also fundamental.
As noted in the introduction, John Rawls’s arguments have
exercised an outsized influence on how political theorists and
jurists continue to understand the demands of secular liberal
societies with respect to religion. And, as we have seen, Rawls
himself was emphatic in claiming the significance of early modern
toleration debates in the development of modern liberalism.
203. This is why Laborde prefers the term “nonestablishment” in explicating liberal principles, but her locution has not yet caught on. LABORDE, supra
note 8, at 69.
204. See, e.g., John Gray, John Stuart Mill on Liberty, Utility, and Rights,
23 HUM. RTS. 80, 80–116 (1981); J. Salwyn Shapiro, John Stuart Mill: Pioneer
of Democratic Liberalism in England, J. HIST. IDEAS 127, 127–60 (1943); Brandon P. Turner, John Stuart Mill and the Antagonistic Foundation of Liberal
Politics, 72 REV. POL. 25, 25–53 (2010).
205. See Frederick Rosen, J.S. Mill on Socrates, Pericles and the Truth, 25
J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 186–88 (2004); see generally JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM,
PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM (2014).
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Rawls was also an unstinting separationist. His 1971 book A
Theory of Justice used the terms “toleration,” “religious freedom,”
and “liberty of conscience” interchangeably,206 while Political
Liberalism associated these straightforwardly with the separation
of church and state.207 Indeed, the influential theory of “public
reason” he proposed in the later work actually worked to extend the
wall of separation between religion and politics to public discourse
itself, by governing the justification of matters pertaining to
“constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” in a wellordered society.208
Nevertheless, one can see clearly at work in Rawls’s thought
traces of both the evangelical and irenic Protestant impulses
associated with Williams and Locke, respectively. Before his death
in 2002, the suggestion that Rawls had been a Protestant thinker,
or that his religious identity had in any way inflected his theory of
political liberalism, would have been deeply offensive to many selfidentified “Rawlsians.” Even with publication in 2009 of his
Princeton undergraduate thesis, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning
of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of
Community, its editor made sure to include a previously
unpublished 1997 reflection, On My Religion, in the same volume,
as a record of exactly where and when Rawls had lost his faith.209
This was reputedly in the Pacific theater in World War II; but
before he enlisted, the young Rawls evidently considered training
as an Episcopalian priest.210 Reading the undergraduate thesis in
light of this surprising fact is fascinating, particularly in its
emphasis on Christian communalism. The young Rawls argued

206. See RAWLS, supra note 194, at 180–94.
207. See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 440–90.
208. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 215.
209. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF SIN
AND FAITH: WITH “ON MY RELIGION” (Thomas Nagel ed., 2009). On the first
page of the thesis, Rawls tells us that “the sooner we stop kow-towing to Plato
and Aristotle the better [because] [a]n ounce of the Bible is worth a pound (possibly a ton) of Aristotle.” John Bordley Rawls, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning
of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community (1942)
[hereinafter RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY], in A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING
OF SIN AND FAITH, supra, at 103, 107. He also declared that this “writer happens to” believe in the existence of devils and angels. Id. at 148.
210. Eric Gregory, Before the Original Position: The Neo-Orthodox Theology
of the Young John Rawls, 35 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 179, 184 (2007).
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that sin should be understood as that which “destr[oys] and
repudiat[es]” community, while faith is “the inner state of a person
who is properly integrated and related to community.”211 Indeed,
Rawls makes the strong, Augustinian claim that human beings are
moral persons by virtue of their creation “Imago Dei as that which
in man makes him capable of entering into community by virtue of
[his] likeness to God, who is in Himself community,” i.e., in the form
of the Trinity.212
Rawls’s early obsession with community as constitutive of
human personality is preserved in his ostensibly individualistic
mature writings: his claim in A Theory of Justice that “[o]nly in a
social union is the individual complete”213 presents a milder version
of his earlier claim in the thesis that man “is nothing until he is in
community” with others or that “[c]ommunality . . . constitutes the
inner essence of man’s being.”214 Accordingly, in the last decade a
number of political theorists and historians have worked to restore
Rawls’s religion as an important feature of his intellectual
formation, one that exercised an often unacknowledged influence
on the direction of his thought long after he had given up on the
priesthood.215
Rawls first made his famous claim about “the wars of religion
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” following the
Reformation as the context within which the principle of toleration
(and hence the tradition of political liberalism) developed in his
Tanner lectures at Oxford in 1977.216 And yet his fascination with

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY, supra note 209, at 113.
Id.
RAWLS, supra note 194, at 523 n.4.
RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY, supra note 209, at 126, 215.
See generally ERIC NELSON, THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERALISM: POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AND THE JUSTICE OF GOD (2019); P. Mackenzie Bok, To The Mountaintop Again: The Early Rawls and Post-Protestant Ethics in Postwar America, 14 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 153 (2017); Gregory, supra note 210.
216. John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY,
EQUALITY, AND LAW: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3, 17
(John Rawls & Sterling M. McMurrin eds., 1987). This claim would become
most closely associated with Political Liberalism, but it appears with almost
identical phrasing in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 223, 223–51 (1985) [hereinafter Rawls,
Justice as Fairness], JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999), and JOHN
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
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the historical process whereby the principle of toleration was
accepted in Western Europe began much earlier. In On My
Religion, Rawls described reading Henry Lea’s massive multivolume history of the Spanish Inquisition and Lord Acton’s review
of it, shortly after his return to the United States after WWII, and
he credited these with his increasing awareness of the persecutory
potential of Christianity.217
Rawls’s historical interest in toleration piqued his
philosophical curiosity, in turn. “Tolerance and its Justifications”
would be the subject of one of his earliest lectures as an assistant
professor of Philosophy at Cornell (c.1953–55).218 In a lecture at
Harvard in the early 1960s, he presented the general acceptance of
religious toleration—as well as the moral (if not political) rejection
of racial segregation—as evidence that the “leading political and
social questions of the modern age” were “in our country [e.g., the
United States] in a sense resolved.”219 The optimism of a midcentury American liberal—one who believed that the telos of
secular liberal democracy could be achieved in the United States
under a Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Warren—can be seen
in Theory, as well. That work offered a highly theoretical and
abstract version of the “first freedom” argument, in which religious
liberty was treated as the individual right from which all others
must flow.220
In Theory, liberty of conscience emerged as the first, “basic”
liberty agreed upon in the Original Position and from which all the
others could be derived: once “[t]he question of equal liberty of
conscience is settled. It [becomes] one of the fixed points of our
considered judgments of justice. . . . [t]he reasoning in this case can
be generalized to apply to other freedoms, although not always with

[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT], as well as in
Rawls’s collected lectures on moral and political philosophy.
217. John Rawls, On My Religion (1997), in A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE
MEANING OF SIN AND FAITH, supra note 209, at 259, 264.
218. John Rawls, Tolerance and its Justifications (unpublished essays and
notes) (on file with Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 7, Folder
16) (Courtesy of Harvard University Archives).
219. John Rawls, Some Notes on the Use of Political Philosophy (undated)
(on file with the Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 35, Folder
10) (Courtesy of Harvard University Archives).
220. See RAWLS, supra note 194, at 180–90.
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the same force.”221 Lest one quibble that arguments for liberty of
conscience are not necessarily the same as arguments for religious
freedom, Rawls explained in a footnote that the principle of equal
liberty derives from the “intuitive idea . . . [of] generaliz[ing] the
principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby arriving at
equal liberty in public institutions.”222
Thus, Rawls’s influential statement in Justice as Fairness:
Political not Metaphysical, that the “public conception of justice” at
the heart of liberal or constitutional democracy derives from
“apply[ing] the principle of toleration to philosophy itself” simply
extended and refined a point he had made fifteen years earlier in
Theory.223 He rendered this theoretical claim about the priority of
toleration for liberalism historical a few years later in Political
Liberalism. But what surprises the visitor to Rawls’s archived
papers at Harvard is how historically minded he had been about
religious toleration from the very start.224 Throughout the 1950s,
Rawls had done an impressive amount of historical research, taking
extensive notes on the Huguenot debates in Holland following the
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes into which Locke’s own Epistola
was an intervention.225
More surprising still is what caught Rawls’s historical interest.
This was above all the so-called “Compromise Theory of Tolerance”
offered by the little-known Dutch theologian Isaac d’Huisseau.226
221. Id. at 206.
222. Id. at 205 n.6. This statement would, of course, surprise many of the
early modern defenders of religious toleration we have considered thus far.
223. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 216, at 223.
224. See generally Teresa M. Bejan, Rawls’s Teaching and the ‘Tradition’ of
Political Philosophy, MOD. INTELL. HIST. (Forthcoming, published online, Mar.
9, 2021), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/modern-intellectual-history/article/rawlss-teaching-and-the-tradition-of-political-philosophy/99BC1
219C38EECFD8A18613E2E7CB5AA [perma.cc/FR44-S6J2].
225. Id. at 29.
226. See John Rawls, Compromise Theory of Tolerance – Agreement on Essentials (undated handwritten notes) (on file with Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 7, Folder 16) (Courtesy of Harvard University Archives); John Rawls, Jurieu’s Refutation of Compromise Theory (undated
handwritten notes) (on file with Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers,
Box 7, Folder 16) (Courtesy of Harvard University Archives); John Rawls, Preconditions of Persecution, (undated handwritten notes) (on file with Harvard
University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 7, Folder 16) (Courtesy of Harvard
University Archives).
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As the title suggests, this was, in fact, an irenic Protestant theory
of comprehension through creedal minimalism and sacramental
inclusion of the kind developed by latitudinarians in England like
Burnet.227 Similarly, in On My Religion, Rawls cited as inspiration
not Locke’s Letter, nor any other classic text of the Anglo-American
liberal tradition, but rather an obscure bit of irenic esoterica by the
French jurist Jean Bodin (c.1530–96):
Of the many texts I have read on religion, few have struck
me as much as Bodin’s . . . Colloquium of the Seven [on the
Secrets of the Sublime]. . . . For him, toleration is an aspect
and consequence of the harmony of nature as expressed in
God’s creation. . . . At the end of the Colloquium, the seven
speakers agree to abandon their attempts to refute one
another’s religious opinions, and instead to encourage one
another to describe their religious views so that all may
learn what others think and be able to understand what
their beliefs are in their best light. Thus, while friendly
and sympathetic discussion of our beliefs is accepted as an
important part of religious life, argument and controversy
are not. In view of the harmony and multiplicity of
religions, what point would argument and controversy
serve?228
In 1997, Rawls was explicit that what appealed to him most in
Bodin was his irenicism—that is, his willingness to see religious
differences between those who were otherwise agreed in a moral
way of life as, strictly speaking, indifferent. It was a vision of
religion in line with the liberal Episcopalian Protestanism of
Moreover, it suggested that this liberal
Rawls’s youth.229
Protestant outlook continued to structure his thinking about the
form and features of a tolerant society, long after he left that
particular church.

227. Id.
228. Rawls, supra note 217, at 266; cf. FORST, supra note 83, at 151 (using
a “Rawlsian expression” of “reasonable disagreement” to describe the religious
debate in Bodin’s work). The Colloquium was first published in English in
1975. See generally JEAN BODIN, COLLOQUIUM OF THE SEVEN ABOUT SECRETS OF
THE SUBLIME (Marion Leathers Daniels Kuntz trans., Princeton U. Press 1975)
(1857). Rawls must have read it shortly thereafter.
229. See Rawls, supra note 217, at 261.
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We can see now that Rawls’s interest in historical arguments
for comprehension bore theoretical fruit in Political Liberalism.
Whereas a Theory of Justice had focused on “congruence” and the
“harmony of interests” as the bonds of well-ordered society, Political
Liberalism stressed the harmony of affect.230 The latter was an
avowedly irenic tract—as Rawls put it in retrospect in 1998: “I
make a point in Political Liberalism of really not discussing
anything, as far as I can help it, that will put me at odds with any
theologian, or any philosopher.”231 One sees this irenic orientation
not only in its search for an underlying agreement on the
fundamenta of liberalism that can serve as “the basis of . . . social
unity” in a liberal society,232 but also in its hope for an
appropriately constrained form of public discourse, through which
citizens’ disagreements might be transformed into sources of
solidarity.
Rather than an idealized extension of the principle of
disestablishment, then, Rawls’s idea of public reason appears here
as an irenic attempt to take controversial items off of the agenda
for the sake of reconciliation—much like the early modern
arguments for comprehension that had inspired Locke centuries
before. As Rawls put it in the Idea of Public Reason, Revisited:
Harmony and concord among doctrines and a people’s
affirming public reason are unhappily not a permanent
condition of social life. Rather, harmony and concord
depend on the vitality of the public political culture and on
citizens’ [sic] being devoted to and realizing the ideal of
public reason. Citizens could easily fall into bitterness and

230. Compare RAWLS, supra note 194, at 104–05, 453 (seeking to describe
the “natural sense in which harmony of social interests is achieved” and
“whether the sense of justice coheres with the conception of our good so that
both work together to uphold a just scheme”), with RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 213 (Public reason “presents how things might be,
taking people as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be.
It describes what is possible and can be, yet may never be, though no less fundamental for that.”).
231. Bernard Prusak, An Interview with John Rawls: Politics, Religion, and
the Public Good, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 25, 1998, at 12, 12–17, reprinted in JOHN
RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 616, 621–22 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
232. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 63.
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resentment, once they no longer see the point of affirming
an ideal of public reason and come to ignore it.233
Evidently, Rawls believed that in this regard political
philosophers like himself occupying positions within the
intellectual establishment had an important role to play in
democratic societies. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement presented
the first “practical role” of political philosophy as “arising from
divisive political conflict and the need to settle the problem of
order”:
We suppose, then, that one task of political philosophy . . .
is to focus on deeply disputed questions and to see whether,
despite appearances, some underlying basis of
philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered. Or
if such a basis of agreement cannot be found, perhaps the
divergence of . . . opinion at the root of divisive political
differences can at least be narrowed.234
The apparent optimism underlying this approach had been
remarked upon years earlier by Isaiah Berlin: “[m]y only doubts
arise about the degree of your optimism in the possibility of offering
your views, with which I totally agree, as a permanent basis within
which disagreements can be resolved.235
In this section, I have not been concerned to unmask or debunk
the ostensibly “secular” views put forward by Rawls and his
followers as fundamentally theological, in the style of some of
liberalism’s critics. Rather, I have sought to show that the striking
Christian communalism of Rawls’s early work informed his later
preoccupation with the sources of social unity in a liberal society.
On this view, the shift in Rawls’s considered judgments on that
score between Theory and Political Liberalism was akin to an
increasingly latitudinarian expansion of the bounds of orthodoxy,
in the hope that the bonds formed between citizens united by an
overlapping consensus might render their civil communion stable
over time. Only now, Rawls insisted that those bonds would not be

233. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 485.
234. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, supra note 216, at 2.
235. Letter from Isaiah Berlin to John Rawls (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with
the Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 39, Folder 6) (Courtesy
of Harvard University Archives).
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of Christian love, but of civic friendship, reciprocity, and mutual
respect.236
Despite his apparent commitment to dis- or non-establishment
as a necessary consequence of the separation of church and state,
we might think of this shift in Rawls’s thought as a shift from the
“evangelical” liberal Protestantism of his youth to an ever more
“irenic” form. But notice that, as in Locke’s arguments, Rawls’s
vision of separation in his later works was also supplemented
institutionally by an irenic liberal establishment, based not in
churches, but in universities and within the legal profession. As
guardians of public reason, this liberal establishment would clearly
have an important role to play in maintaining norms of civility and
modeling the intellectual work of reconciliation for their cocitizens—for example, by keeping religious arguments out of
legislation and the courts.
To return to the question motivating this Symposium:
twentieth-century liberals like Rawls would strongly deny that
America is a Christian nation. Of course, Christians of many
different denominations can and should be able to affirm the
principles of justice as fairness underlying its secular and
democratic political institutions from within their various
theological worldviews; however, so should the adherents of any
number of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious and
non-religious.237 Nevertheless, maintaining the “reasonableness”
of these doctrines would seem to rely on the ongoing entrenchment
of irenic liberalism within the culture of our legal, educational, and,
indeed, religious institutions and their leadership. Here, we find
something like the informal moral establishment imagined by
Locke—but one no longer limited exclusively to theists and other
believers.
CONCLUSION

Contrary to modern expectations, the three pillars of the AngloAmerican liberal tradition surveyed here do not speak univocally
when it comes to the issue of (dis)establishment. In Rawls, as in
Locke, one finds nothing like Williams’s society of sects. While

236. See Bejan, supra note 24, at 144.
237. See generally, ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE
SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS (2009).
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political liberalism on the Rawlsian model continues to presuppose
the inadvertent establishment of evangelical Protestantism as a
matter of law, it embraces Locke’s irenic establishmentarian
impulse as a matter of jurisprudential and academic culture. On
this model, the state can maintain its formal separation from
religion, while a cultural establishment of university-trained jurists
and intellectuals sees to it, with public support, that the desired
separation between religious and civil communities is maintained.
That American democracy and jurisprudence do not work this
way in practice is, again, beside the point for political theorists like
myself. The theory works well enough, and it continues to be taught
in elite educational institutions across the world. And so, while I
agree with Cecile Laborde in her response to liberalism’s critics that
liberalism itself is not a religion, I nevertheless believe that
liberalism can and does function sometimes as an established
church. On this view, liberal egalitarians like Rawls and Laborde
herself are not so much “rootless” but emphatically rooted
cosmopolitans, whose parish is not bounded geographically, but
rather intellectually and institutionally through shared sacred
texts (both the American Bill of Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights) and elite academic institutions.
These (primarily Anglophone) universities credential the young
people who populate international institutions and preach the
virtues of an individualistic ethos that valorizes conscientious
dissent—while nonetheless seeking to preserve and reproduce a
dominant, liberal democratic consensus for individuals to dissent
from. Within this informal cultural establishment, dissent (of the
right kind) is admirable, as well as permissible. So long, that is, as
it knows its place.
Little wonder, then, that Christians and conservatives
complain vociferously today about the “liberal establishment” in
America, whether in the law, the media, the arts, or above all the
universities. As I have shown in this essay, university politics have
long played a major part in the politics of religious establishment;
why shouldn’t the same be true today? In these and other
controversies, one hears definite echoes of early modern debates,
reflecting our ongoing—and perhaps inescapable—intellectual
entanglement with the establishmentarian presuppositions that
produced our American culture of dissent.
As for my own answer to the question at hand: Is America a
Christian Nation? I say, yes and no. To this day, America has an
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established religion in the evangelical and sectarian legal regime
bequeathed to us by radical dissenters like Roger Williams and
others of his ilk. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
informal establishment of liberal jurists, academics, and
intellectuals envisioned by Locke and Rawls can withstand the
rising pressure from critics on the Right—and increasingly, on the
Left—and maintain its social, cultural, and political privileges as
the clerical elite in our established church.

